

MARYLAND

HISTORICAL MAGAZINE

VOL. I.

SEPTEMBER, 1906.

No. 3.

A REVIEW OF THE BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG.

II.

The testimony which I now submit comes from the men who participated in that unfortunate battle, and most, if not all of them acknowledge that but for the blundering of some one a different result would have been attained.

The first writer to be presented is Col. McLane, an eminent tactician of Revolutionary fame, who said :

"At sunrise in the morning of August 23, General Winder and I visited the President and submitted to him a plan of battle, both offensive and defensive, which had the approval of several brigade commanders assembled at or near Bladensburg, that to concentrate our main force at some protected spot which would enable them to pour a destructive fire into the ranks of the advancing enemy, being kept at bay by the artillery and riflemen, and within easy call the remainder of the army on the Georgetown and Washington roads, thus making it impossible for the enemy to pass a given point even if they succeeded in forcing the first line from their position ; then to have at hand the cavalry and light artillery to annoy the rear guard if the enemy retreated. Now in the event that the enemy penetrated these two lines of

defenses and drove back the artillery, the infantry and riflemen were to find protected places behind the stone walls and fences and pour a rapid and continuous fire into them, making their progress impossible.

"In support of this plan I mentioned the well-known affair at Lexington, Mass., in which 1800 British were almost annihilated by the cross fire of scattered companies protected by fences and bushes, wood-piles, and houses; and concluded by saying, Mr. President, in the success of this against the best plan executed by the enemy, I will pledge my reputation and my life, and I earnestly recommend it to your adoption.

"General Armstrong, the Secretary of War, being present, appeared to be pleased and it is supposed discussed the matter with his Excellency after our departure, but we might have saved our breath, for nothing came of it."

Major William Pinkney, speaking of the changes made in the plans at the last moment, said: "The 5th Md. Infantry, much to the chagrin of Col. Sterett and to the great disparagement of my battalion, were made to retire to ground several hundred yards in the rear, but visible to the enemy, where they could display nothing more than gallantry."

General Smith of Washington, said that "when the order was given for a general retreat my soldiers and officers evidenced astonishment and indignation that they were to fall back ignominiously before they had had a chance to resist so impudent an enemy."

The testimony of General Tobias E. Stansbury is quite voluminous and I can give only a few facts bearing upon the principal points at issue.

According to this soldier "The 5th Infantry under Col. Joseph Sterett, the best disciplined and equipped regiment in my command, indeed on the field, had been placed in a position slightly in the rear of the Baltimore Artillery and Pinkney's riflemen, while the regiments of Ragan and Shutz, also of Maryland, were placed on the other end not far from the Washington road, with the intention that the infantry were to protect the artillery and riflemen and prevent their being flanked. This

position was one of great responsibility and great honor, which they seemed to appreciate for they moved to their positions with alacrity and enthusiasm.

"As I rode off a short distance to give some order to the artillery, I was greatly surprised to see the regiments of Regan and Shutz marching to the rear at the moment when the enemy was seen in the road. I hastened to where General Winder stood on a little elevation and while conversing with him regarding this most unmilitary and incomprehensible movement and turned to point out the mistake of this order, when to my amazement and consternation saw the 5th Regiment also marching away to an exposed position in reach of the enemy's rockets, without cover or opportunity to inflict any damage whatever upon the enemy, thus taking away the support of the artillery and riflemen and leaving them to receive the first shock of the attack. I rode quickly back to General Winder and demanded sharply to know why such an order had been given, although I suspected who had done so, for I saw James Monroe riding with Col. Sterett, and I knew he was interfering with the commander.

"To my inquiry, General Winder replied: 'I do not know, it was not my order, nor does it meet with my approbation. I suppose my superior officer has ordered it.'"

(Now General Winder had but one living superior officer and that was the President of the United States.)

General Stansbury continues: "I knew in a moment that this last movement had lost us the battle and before a shot was fired, for it left Pinkney's riflemen and the two Baltimore batteries without support, but the number of dead British soldiers found opposite this command after the battle will prove how well they did their duty, even without support."

I write the reliable testimony of General Stansbury with great pride, and let it here be recorded to the honor of Pinkney and his brave riflemen as well as the Baltimore batteries of Magruder and Myers, that had they been veterans of many campaigns instead of militia, they could not have been more gallant, and Pinkney deserted by all but the artillery, remained in the firing line until

overwhelmed by three times their number, and although wounded himself, retired from the field without the loss of a gun.

A most remarkable story now follows and from no other than General William H. Winder, the commander. Said he :

"A few moments preceding the battle I rode up to a battery which had been thrown up to command the street entering Bladensburg and found them to be Magruder and Myers' artillery from Baltimore ; they were well posted and were supported on the right by a battalion of riflemen and on the left by two regiments of infantry, all of Baltimore.

"I learned that General Stansbury was on a slight rise of ground near an apple orchard with the 5th Regiment and in a most excellent position.

"I rode quickly to his side and found him and Col. Monroe together. Col. Monroe said as he rode away that he had ordered Col. Sterett to post his command in a rear position. I had scarcely time to examine the situation when an orderly rode up rapidly and informed me that a column of the enemy was in sight. The riflemen soon after began to fire and after a few volleys were seen to fall back to the edge of the orchard and soon after to retire to the left of Stansbury's line.

"I immediately ordered the 5th Md. Regiment forward to sustain the artillery which were now giving signs of an intention to fall back ; they immediately commenced the movement in the face of a shower of rockets, when the two regiments of Regan and Shutz, occupying the center of the line, received a shower of rockets in their ranks which caused them to break ranks and fly. After several fruitless efforts to rally them, I turned to the 5th Regiment, but to my surprise they had also fallen back. Riding to their commander, I then ordered them all to fall back and make another stand near Washington, but at Washington I found no troops.

"Undoubtedly some very grave errors occurred in the action at Bladensburg, which I would not repeat under the same conditions."

This account from General Winder is by no means satisfactory, or does it agree with other accounts.

General Armstrong, the Secretary of War, said, in conversation

a few days after the battle, when most of the people and officials had returned to the Capital :

"After I was requested by the President to give up for a time the functions of my office, I was a mere spectator, and as soon as I saw that the infantry had been taken away from the artillery I saw that an invitation was given the enemy to turn our left, and they were not long in accepting it either. The busy and blundering Col. Monroe was responsible for the defeat a short time later. I am in no way responsible for the disastrous result."

After the battle no one could be found to accept the responsibility of the fatal blundering, but almost every man, except General Armstrong, tried to fasten the blame upon General Winder on the ground of inexperience of military affairs ; and while it is certain that he was not the man to command on so important an occasion, he cannot be held responsible for the disasters of that day, for while he was nominally the chief in command, the orders which made defeat inevitable emanated from his superior, the President, and this came out in the investigation by Congress, but the results of this were of such a partizan character that none of the military men would abide by it.

General Winder, under severe censure, made no effort to shift the responsibility on any one, which he could easily have done, and had he done so, it might have resulted in preventing the election of James Monroe as the successor of James Madison, but he remained silent and soon severed his connection with the army. He may have been without that military experience necessary in a commander ; but he was never without honor, truthfulness, and patriotism : he was a true Maryland gentleman.

The over-anxiety of the administration to relieve themselves of censure, was evidence of their deserving it. If they had selected a commander-in-chief solely upon the ground of his fitness, and had complied with his reasonable demands as far as laid in their power, there would have been no necessity to exert that powerful political influence which they brought to bear upon Congress later to suppress the testimony which showed that the blame for the blundering of Mr. Monroe by authority of President Madison had made the catastrophe inevitable.

In the proclamation of the President later it was made to convey the impression that the disaster was chargeable to the private soldiers and the subordinate officers, which according to the testimony that I present is absolutely untrue. While nearly all the troops present were raw militia with only a limited acquaintance with the drill master and had never faced an enemy before, they evidenced, with one or two exceptions, a desire to engage in the conflict.

Confidence of troops in their commander is certainly the main element of victory ; but how was it possible for General Winder's soldiers, having no personal knowledge of him, to feel a confidence, when at the most critical moment those who knew him best—the President and Cabinet—were unwilling to trust to his capacity and kept him in a state of supervision and doubt all the time, urging him to do this and that, and finally with the enemy almost upon them, posted his troops for him without his knowledge or consent.

The few personal friends of the selected commander admitted that there was nothing in his antecedent career that recommended him to the preference of the President. But we do find great fault with General Winder for accepting so important a command when in the regular army in and near the Capital there were a number of experienced officers of the Revolution.

Winder had just returned from a long captivity in Canada and was not thoroughly conversant with the conditions that prevailed ; he was not in a mental or physical state to carry out the details necessary to so important a defense ; and before the battle his appointment was spoken of as a great mistake and afterwards as a calamity.

Generals Samuel Smith, John Stricker, Tobias E. Stansbury, and Thomas Foreman, all of Maryland, and of Revolutionary experience, would have been acceptable, and General Moses Porter, the Commandant at Norfolk, a splendid soldier of forty years' experience in military affairs and outranking General Winder and a dozen others, would have inspired the soldiers with confidence when they appeared on the field. But the fact remains that although he did all in his power to rally the men in the last

moment, with the hope that a stand could be made at Washington, no soldiers were found, upon his arrival, to do so,—the gate of the nation's Capital stood wide open, the British accepted the invitation, and by acts of barbarity and vandalism steeped their flag in ignominy.

The defenseless condition of the city was well known to Ross and Cockburn, and why they should destroy our Capital was known only to themselves, for certainly there was no military advantage to be gained by the burning of Washington.

The lighted torch in the hands of Lieutenant Parker of the navy, by order of Admiral Cockburn, set fire to our public buildings and all but the Patent Office were destroyed. In the burning of the Library of Congress our government lost many valuable documents and rolls of troops in the Revolution; and but for the providential torrent of rain which burst upon the Capital City about nine o'clock that evening, not a building would have been spared. Our government, stung to the quick by this wanton destruction of public buildings and property, caused Mr. Monroe to write to Admiral Cockburn and General Ross regarding this uncivilized method of warfare. Cockburn's reply was "That he had been instructed by his government to lay waste such towns and districts on the coast that he found assailable, but upon reflection he experienced much regret that it should have been done, and if it were revocable would not be repeated under similar circumstances."

General Ross made no reply, although he received the letter on September 6th. But nothing could have been expected of him, for he had won his spurs in the Spanish wars and acquired his morals and learned his catechism in that atmosphere. If he had been in any way responsible for this outrage he never regretted it, for it is said he boasted of it on his way to his death at North Point.

Civilized warfare has its laws, and international ethics should prevail during the time of war as well as peace; and the greatest achievement of Christian civilization has been to soften the horrors and excesses of war and to condemn savage barbarity.

When the news of the capture of Washington was received in

London it caused great rejoicing. The Tower guns were fired three times in honor of the event. But when the details of the destruction of public and private property and the plunder of the people was received, it caused great shame.

The *London Spectator* said: "Would that we could throw a veil of oblivion over our transaction at Washington. Even the Cossacks spared Paris, but Englishmen spared not the Capital of America."

The *Liverpool Mercury* said: "If the people of the United States retain any portion of the spirit with which they contended successfully for their independence, the effect of these flames will not soon be extinguished."

The *British Annual* said: "The proceedings of Ross and Cockburn at Washington were a return to the times of barbarism, which would bring a heavy censure upon British character."

Let it be said to the shame of George IV that this warfare, which would have disgraced banditti, not only met with his approval, but Admiral Cockburn upon his return to England was the subject of his favor. The first honor conferred upon him was that of Royal jailer to Bonaparte on his way to St. Helena, and is said he insulted General Bonaparte only three times. The last caused the prisoner to turn his back on the insulter and walk away, to be reminded by the Admiral that he, Bonaparte, had not read Chesterfield carefully. "No," replied Bonaparte; "I have not, but I see you have."

As soon as the order was given for a general retreat at the moment when the 5th Regiment fell back, it was known to Mr. Madison that the army of defense had been totally defeated and dispersed, and that no stand could be made at Washington. He hastened to the White House and found Mrs. Madison and her attendants packing up every article that could be carried away in her carriage, she having been notified of the great disaster only a short time before the arrival of the President.

All was silent except the low voice of Mrs. Madison giving directions; the carriage was before the door; the President was hurriedly gathering up official documents and cramming them into a portfolio. An explosion near by alarmed them and quickly

gathering up the things she hastened to the door, giving directions to one of the servants to carry the Stuart portrait of Washington to a friend in Georgetown, and entered her carriage just as the President and friends mounted their horses. Her carriage was about to move off when she remembered not having seen the Declaration, it being overlooked in their haste. Reentering the house she soon returned, holding up triumphantly that precious document; entering her carriage she bowed to her husband and drove off. Not a tear was upon her cheek at this sad hour, but on her face was a look of defiance, with a salutation of dignity to all whom she passed. She bade adieu to her home and became a fugitive from her country's capital.

Mr. Madison, in company with some of his cabinet and friends, all on horseback, rode away in another direction, it having been arranged between them that Mrs. Madison was to await him at a certain tavern on the Maryland side.

Mr. Richard Rush, in a letter written some years after the war, referring to the flight of the President, said :

"Never can be forgotten by me as I accompanied out of the city on that memorable night of August 24, 1814, President Madison, General Armstrong, Secretary of War, General Mason, Mr. Charles Carroll of Bellevue, and Mr. Tench Ringgold.

"We were all on horseback, as we looked back over our homes on that night and saw that all of the public buildings were on fire, some burning slowly and others with sudden bursts of flames, mounting high up in the horizon, shall I ever forget these moments? At intervals the dismal sight was lost to view as we rode down hill to again see the heavens lighted up as we rode up hill again; on we went, slowly and sadly followed by our servants, and soon reached the Virginia side of the Potomac with the intention of recrossing to the Maryland side at Great Falls, to be near the scene of action and to watch the movements of the enemy."

The following is a most valuable and interesting letter written by Miss Polly Kemp of the Eastern Shore, but a resident of Washington at that time, which throws some light on the state of affairs and certainly clears away many doubts which have existed for eighty-eight years regarding the movements of the President and

Mrs. Madison in their flight from Washington. The letter is written to her cousin Alice in Baltimore, is dated on December, 1814, and reads thus :

"It was an almost suffocating day in August, the 24th, when the sound of guns reached our ears, we were all tuned up to a high pitch of excitement from early morn until afternoon when our flying soldiers from the battle-field at Bladensburg, told us that our army had been completely routed and that the enemy was marching rapidly on to Washington, Uncle John, who, as you know, was in the city militia, came to us immediately and all was bustle. While the carriage was coming, we got together all of our valuables and soon we were in the midst of a great cavalcade of teams of all descriptions, moving as rapidly as possible into Maryland, and it was near midnight before we reached the tavern. Before that it began to rain in great torrents, the lightning and thunder adding to the terrors of a dark night, our man walked ahead with a lantern, the outhouses and stable were full so that our poor tired rain-beaten horse had to be tied to the trees and remain out in the rain for hours, we were made as comfortable as was possible in our wet garments, and had been seated scarcely an hour when there was a loud rap upon the door and the great rough tavern keeper made it known to us in an angry voice that the intruder was Dolly Madison, as he attempted to push her away from the door. Father indignantly sprang to the door and pushing aside the angry keeper, went out in the rain to find that lady walking away in that terrible rain. Taking her by the arm he led her back into the house. The keeper began denouncing the President as the cause of the war and the destruction of the capital ; many of the occupants murmured against admitting her, but father was determined that she should remain and remain she did : we took her under our special protection. We sat silently until 3 or 4 o'clock in the morning, when a rap came upon the door, one of our party opened the door and who should walk in but President Madison himself and several gentlemen, but the President did not remain long. An hour later a messenger announced to the President that the enemy was coming that way, he quickly drew on his great cloak and kissing his wife went out again into the storm

followed by his faithful followers. By daybreak, Mrs. Madison became restless and could not stand the suspense any longer and started out with her coachman to find Mr. Madison. After they had gone some of the people in the tavern who were under the influence of liquor, were very angry with father for admitting them. How very sorry we were for Queen Dolly as she was called sometimes.

"During all these indignities she spoke not a word. Towards morning a straggler came in and reported that the enemy had evacuated Washington, and soon the sad cavalcade began their tramp back to the city. It is true we were all indignant at the inactivity of Mr. President and his advisers in their stupid management of affairs. You or I could have done better. But at the sight of lovely Dolly Madison our bitterness relented, and we all tried to heal the wounds received at the hands of their countrymen, but the comedy of errors, as the battle was called, was over but not forgotten, and never will be while the blackened walls remain to remind us of the barbarian's visit and our great loss, and as father says, the blow to our national dignity. How proud you must have been to see your brave Baltimore boys marching home from North Point. I was so proud when I read the account of that glorious battle in the newspapers. I am a native of the Eastern Shore and I glory in it."

You will notice that I have spoken little of the other forces and confined my remarks to Maryland alone, because the others played so little part in the war game, but a large part in the stampede which no human power could arrest.

As the battle progressed, they simply melted away, home, country, honor was lost sight of, personal safety was sought at the sacrifice of everything. Let it be said, however, in extenuation of their conduct, that they were only militia, never having been on the firing line before, and so badly scattered that they lost confidence in themselves, too readily listening to idle rumors that floated over the battle-field, with no knowledge or confidence in their commander, what other result could have been attained?—so that the brunt of the battle fell upon the Baltimore brigade with the exception of several companies which very early sought safety

in flight. But old General Stansbury was so sure of his men that he went into battle exultantly; his spirit of daring was so ardent that it was a source of real inspiration to his men, and so crest-fallen was he when he saw that a bungling hand had robbed his brigade of a great victory that he used language stronger than elegant.

The statement was made by Admiral Cockburn, that the American army of 8,000 men had been dislodged by about 1,500 men as soon as reached. If this statement was accepted, how can one reconcile the fact that they were two hours in making their way through militia regiments; but there is no truth in it. The actual number of men in conflict at one time on the American side was about 2,100, while that of the enemy was 2,000 to 3,000, because the original attacking party of the enemy was 1,500, but it must be remembered that they were reinforced several times, and it is well to remember also that the artillery of Magruder and Myers and Pinkney's riflemen, not over 300 men, held the 1,500 men of the enemy in check for over an hour without any support at all. Had the 5th and the two other Maryland regiments remained as their support, the British could never have crossed the bridge.

As to the amount of fighting done by Pinkney and the artillery in that short time, nearly 200 dead bodies of the enemy were found after the battle in front of this command.

Niles' Register places the number of the enemy at 5,100; Gleg, the English historian, says it was 4,500; the *Subaltern*, 4,000; the exact number we shall never know for none of these writers have been guided by truth.

Another English historian, Allison, is more untruthful than all others and that in the face of official reports of those in command. Honorable warfare makes the victorious proud but generous, proud of their prowess and this oftentimes removes the sting of defeat from the brave vanquished; but in the breasts of the American soldiers as they retreated from Bladensburg, as they looked back at the mailed hand of the barbarian, deep hatred for their foes filled their breasts and thirst for revenge filled their hearts.

On the morning of September 14, 1814, when it became known that General Ross had been killed and his army under Col. Brooke

retreated before the brigade of Stansbury at Loudenslager's Hill, the shame which they had felt at Bladensburg for their heartless enemy, was changed to contempt for the commander who feared to meet again the militia of Maryland.

It is deeply regretted by every true lover of our country, that the splendid services rendered the nation by James Madison, for he was justly called the father of the Constitution, should have been dimmed by the closing years of his administration ; for while he was a true patriot and a wise statesman, he knew nothing of the science of war and, unfortunately, his advisers knew little more.

ADDENDA.

FROM AN OLD NEWSPAPER, PUBLISHED IN 1848, ENTITLED

"AN HISTORICAL ERROR CORRECTED."

"It has always been universally believed for the last thirty years and more that the full length portrait of General Washington, which adorned one of the rooms in the State House at Washington, was saved from the conflagration caused by the British in 1814, by General Mason. We know that General Jackson was so strongly impressed by that belief as to express some anger when the merit of the rescue was ascribed to another. Mr. Jacob Barker, now of New Orleans, who was one of the real saviours on that occasion, has been induced recently to write out his recollections on the subject for the *N. Y. Express*, in the form of a letter to the gentleman, Robt. G. L. De Peyster, who assisted him in saving the picture. It contains many interesting references in localities in the neighborhood of Georgetown, D. C., relating that it was at the instance of Mrs. Dolly Madison, who in that hour of danger evinced the most admirable presence of mind, that they took measures to receive the picture, procuring a cart and taking it through Georgetown, thence on the road to the Montgomery County Court House, where after concealing themselves in the woods for some time to rest, they deposited it with a widow lady at a country house, some distance from the road. Six weeks later, Mr. Barker called, in company with Miss Dashiell and took the

picture away to Washington and delivered it to Mr. Monroe, the Secretary of State and War, who promised to have it varnished and placed in a new frame and reinstated in the President's house where it still remains. What agency General Mason may have had in restoring it to its present place, Mr. Barker does not know. Mr. Barker accounts for General Jackson's error by supposing that General Mason might possibly have been of a party who came in with the President from the battle-field (Bladensburg), whilst they were engaged in securing the picture, several persons he says assisted in taking it down and General Mason might have been one of them, but the most active was the venerable Mr. Carroll. He says of the party, Mr. Carroll left with the President and the others all left before the retreating army reached the city, excepting you, myself and servant."

NOTE.—General Mason was with President Madison on the battle-field of Bladensburg and rode with him to the White House and may have assisted in taking down the picture, but General Mason and Mr. Carroll rode away with President Madison into Virginia, and Mr. Barker and others, with the painting in their possession, rode towards Georgetown.

A. K. HADEL.

TWO COMMISSIONS.

COMMISSION OF CHARLES I. TO LEONARD CALVERT :
JANY. 26, 1643/4.

FROM STATE PAPERS, PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON.

CHARLES R.

Charles by the Grace of God of Scotland ffraunce and Ireland King, defender of the ffaith &c to our trustye and well beloved Leonard Calvert esquire greeting Whereas we are sufficiently informed that our Rebellious Subjects of the Citty of London drive a great trade in the Dominion and Collony of Virginia receiving dayly great advantadges from thence which they ympiously spend in vaste Contribucons towards the maintenance of an unnatural warre against us Wee therefore having an especiall trust and Reposing great Confidence in your abilitye fidelitye and affection to our Service have with mature advice and deliberacon now made and by these Presents for us and our heyres doe make and Constitute you the said Leonard Calvert our full and absolute Commissioner to the effect following That is to say Wee by these presents give you full power & authority & strictly command you to repayre with all Convenient Speede unto our sayde Collony of Virginia and together with the assistance of our trustye and well beloved Sir William Berkely, Knight &c Governor of our sayd Collony of Virginia or other our Lft Governour there for the tyme being there to seize and take or cause to be seized and taken into your hands all such Shipes and Vessells ordnance arms and Ammunicon thereunto belonging and also all Plate money goods Chattells and Debts of any Londoners whatsoever or of any of our Citties Towns or places in Actual Rebellion against us—As likewise to receive all such Shippes and Vessells Ordnance Armes and Ammunicon Plate money goods or Chattells and Debts which our sayd Governour for the tyme being shall with your Assistance & advice or otherwayes seize or cause to be seized and delivered into

your hands within the Precinct of his Government with full power to dispose of any of them by way of Sale Composition or barter according to your best discretion upon such Accompts to be made by you thereof as you are by this our Commission authorized and required to make as also to compound agree and make releases and discharges for and Concerning any Debt owing from any Inhabitant there by Sea or land upon Accompt or otherwise to any Londoner or other the persons in Rebellion as above-menconed And wee will hereby will and ordaine that such Composition release discharge and bargain be good as well against us o^r heyres as against any pretender whatsoever And we do hereby authorize you in case you happen in your voyage outward or homeward bound to light upon any Shippe or Vessell which you shall have cause to Suspect doth belong to anye Londoner or other persons in rebellion as aforesayd uppon the High Seas or in any harbor porte or Creeke not under the Commannd of our Castles of our sd Collony of Virginia to bid them amaine in our name, and if you find them to belong to anye Londoner or other pson in rebellion as aforesayd to seize and take the sayd Shippes and men Goods and merchandizings in them into your hands, and uppon their refusall or delay to yeeld themselves unto you, the same by force of Armes to assault surprise subdue and bring under your Commannd: and the psons resisting to slay or kill as in case of open warre and the Shippes or Vessells soe taken together with them their tackle and furniture Ordnance and Ammunicon Goods and Merchandize dispose of att your best discrecon upon such Accompts to be made by you thereof as you are by this Commission authorized and required to make, And when you shall have finished this your employment in those partes and shall be ready to returne thence Wee doe hereby give you full power and Authority to loade aboard such Shippe or Shippes as shall be soe taken or seized upon as aforesayd any goods or merchandize which you shall not have disposed of in those parts And our will and pleasure is and wee strictly Commannd that before your deptime from Virginia at yo^r returne homewards you make a true and pfect Inventory of all Shippes and goods soe to be seized by land or by water in Virginia as aforesayd And of all Compositions Sales and releases

by you to be made by virtue of this our Commission to you and that you deliver the said Inventory upon oath unto our said Governour under your hands and demand a Duplicate thereof under his hand to be tendered unto us or to whom we shall appoint att your returne. And we doe also hereby make and Constitute you a Captaine and Commander in Chiefe not only of the Shippe you go in and of all other Shippes of Warre which you shall carrye with you in this voyage: But also of all other Shippes and Vessells which you shall take either by the way going or returning or cause to be seized on in Virginia or elsewhere in those partes as aforesayd and of the officers and Seamen belonging to them with full power and authoritye to make & ordaine Captaines Masters and other Officers and Mariners in any and every of them and for such wages as you shall agree with them for And wee also by these Presents give you further power and Authoritye in this your voyage if occasion shall aryse of making Sedition or practises against this our present Service or any other Crime with the advice of the cheife Officers of your Shippe or Shippes by Martiall law to proceed against such as shall be under your Command upon the high Seas or in anye porte or harbour where your Shippe or Shippes shall ride not under the Command of our Castles there and to inflict any punishment on the offender or offenders according to the Qualitye of his offence and Custome of the Sea even to the mutilacon of member and life yf the Qualitye of the crime soe require in as full large and ample manner as any other Generall or Commander of ours in cheife in any of our Armies by Sea or land now doe or may doe. And for your so doing this shall be your sufficient warrant and discharge: And in case you shall happen to find any ffreemen in Virginia not Servants nor indebted to our good Subjects there who shall be desirous and willing to come over with you to serve us here by Sea or by land then our pleasure is that with the Assent of our Governor there for the tyme being you entertaine them aboard your sayd Shippe or Shippes and that you agree with them on Our behalfe to enter into our pay att their first arrivall in England under the Command of such experienced Captaine or Captaines officer or officers as they shall best like of amongst those of that Countrey who shall happen to

come over with them which agreements of yours on our behalfe wee for our parte shall fully pforme unto them And in regard our trusty & well beloved Cæcilius Lord Baltimore is to be att a greate charge in provision of victualls men Armes and divers other things for the accomplishing of this Service of seizing the Shippes and goods abovementioned wee in consideracon thereof and for divers other good Causes & Consideracons have given granted and by these presents doe give and grant unto our Commissioner to and for the use of the said Cæcilius Lord Baltimore the one half or moyetie of all the said Shippes or Vessells Armes Ammunicon and tackle thereunto belonging And alsoe of all the said goods merchandize debts and money which shall be soe taken and seized on either in Virginia or in your voyadge thither or return from thence as aforesaid and also of all other proffitts and other perquisites whatsoever arising thereupon freed and dischargd from all duties Taxes and payments whatsoever to us our heyres and Successors or to any of our officers whatsoever And we doe hereby authorize will and require you our Commissioner to dispose of the said Moyetie in such manner as the said Lord Baltimore shall direct you for his use And that you are accomptable to his Executors Administrators or Assignes for the same according to the true intent and meaning of these presents without any Accompt to be given therefore to us our Heyres or Successors our officers or other pson whatsoever And that you give a right and true Accompt to us our heyres and Successors of the other halfe or Moyetie of all the Shippes vessels Armes Ammunicon and tackle thereunto belonging And alsoe of all the said goods Merchandize debts and money which shall be soe taken or seized on as aforesaid and of all proffitts and pquisites whatsoever arising thereupon the residue of which said Moyetie last menconed wee will have reserved for our own use, after you have first deducted and payd out of our sayd moyetie 2.000^{lbs} Sterling in Tobaccoc at the rate of 3^d p pound to our sayd R^t trusty and well beloved S^r William Barkely Knt our sayd Governor of Virginia in full discharge of soe much money due for his salary or pension of 1000^{lbs} p [ann.] allowed unto him by us for his Service of being our Governour there which wee doe hereby authorize will and require you to pay unto him according out of

our sayd Moyetie in case our sayd Moyetie amount to soe much in value And after you have alsoe deducted out of our said Moyetie all Charges which shall be incurred in this your Employment after your arrivall in Virginia untill your return againe to our Port of Bristoll, And for the transportacon from Virginia into England of such volunteers as you shall entertaine as aforesaid to come and serve us in our warres here; All which wee doe and shall allowe unto you upon your sayd Accompt And wee doe hereby cleerly discharge and acquitt as well you as the said Lord Baltimore and his heyres Executors Administrators & assigns of either of you from all other Accompt concerning the Moyetie abovementioned to be disposed of to the sayd Lord Baltimores use as well against us and our heyres as against all our Treasurers receivers Admiralls and officers of Admiralties and all other officers and ministers whatsoever forbidding them and every of them to sue vex molest or in any way trouble you or him the sayd Lord Baltimore or his heyres Executors Administrators or Assignes in any of the Courtes of Justice, or elsewhere concerning the same or any parte thereof: And willing and requiring our Treasurer or under Treasurer of the Exchequer Admirall or Vice Admirall and all others our ministers and officers for the tyme whome it may concerne—That they and every of them doe admitt of these presents of the enrollment thereof as a sufficient discharge of him the said Lord Baltimore And alsoe to you our sayd Commissioner and to his and your and each of your heyres Executors Administrators and assignes respectively in that behalfe And wee for us our heyres and Successors doe hereby covenant and promise to and with you our sayd Commissioner and also to and with the said Lord Baltimore his and your and each of your heyres Executors and Administrators respectively that wee will at all tymes by o^r royall authority protect and defend you our sayd Commissioner and alsoe the sayd Lord Baltimore his and your and each of your heyres Executors and Administrators and all other pson and psons employed by you or either of you from any danger trouble or molestacon which you or he or any of them may incurre by or from any pson or psons whatsoever for or by reason of prosecuting or pforming of all or any of our Com^{ma}nds in this Commission menconed; And alsoe

that wee our heyres and Successors will and shall att all times by the same royal authority protect and defend the sayd Lord Baltimore and his heyres Ex^{ts} Administrators and Assignes in the quiett enjoying of the Moyetie of all the sayd Shippes goods Armes Ordnance Ammunicon money and Merchandize which shall be soe seized as aforesayd and of all other, proffitts and Perquisites whatsoever arising thereuppon which are by this our Commission granted to you the sayd Commissioner for the use of the sayd Lord Baltimore as aforesaid against all psons or pretender whatsoever And lastly wee doe by these presents strictly charge and require as well our sayd Governor and Councell and Captaines of our fforts and Castles as all other our officers ministers magistrates and loving subjects of Virginia to be ayding and assisting unto you our sayd Commissioner to the uttermost of their power in the due execucon of the premises as in a matter which Concernes the Safety and preservacon of our pson and State here in England as they will answer the Contrary at their & utmost pe^{ll}. In witness whereof wee have caused these our letters to be made Pattents; witness our selfe att Oxford this sixe and twenty^b day of January in the nineteenth year of our raigne.

COMMISSION OF CHARLES II. TO SIR WILLIAM DAVENANT,
FEBRUARY 16, 1649-50.

FROM THE CALVERT PAPERS.

CHARLES R.

Charles, by the Grace of God, King of England, Scotland, France, and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, &c. To Our Trusty and well-beloved Sir William Davenant, Knight, and to all others, to whom these presents shall come, greeting: whereas the Lord Baltimore, Proprietary of the Province and Plantations of Maryland in America, doth visibly adhere to the Rebels of England, and admit all kinde of Schismaticks, and Sectaries, and other ill-affected persons, into the said Plantations of Maryland, so that we have cause to apprehend very great prejudice to Our Service thereby, and very great danger to Our Plantations in Virginia, who have carried themselves with so much Loyalty and Fidelity,

to the King Our Father, of blessed memory, and to us; Know yee therefore, That Wee, reposing speciall trust and confidence in the courage, conduct, loyalty, and good affection to us, of you Sir William Davenant, and for prevention of the danger and inconveniences above-mentioned, doe by these presents, nominate, constitute, and appoint you Our Lievtenant Governour of the said Province, or Plantations of Maryland, with all Forts, Castles, Plantations, Ports, and other Strengths thereunto belonging; to have, hold, exercise, and enjoy the said place and command of Our Lievtenant Governour of Maryland, during Our pleasure, with all Rights, Priviledges, Profits, and Allowances any wayes appertaining, or belonging to the same: And although wee intend not hereby to prejudice the right of the Proprietary in the Soyle, but have, for Our Security, thought fit to intrust you, during these troubles, This clause includes Soyle and all. Wee notwithstanding give you full Power and Authority to doe all things in the said Plantations, which shall bee necessary for Our Service, and for securing them in their Loyalty, and Obedience to us, and prevention of all dangers that may arise from thence to Our Loyall Plantations of Virginia: Further, requiring and commanding you to hold due correspondence with Our Trusty and well-beloved Sir William Berkley, Knight, Our Governour of the said Plantations of Virginia, and to comply with him in all things necessary for Our Service, and the mutuall good of both Plantations, requiring and commanding hereby all Officers, and Ministers, and all other Our Subjects whatsoever of the said Plantations of Maryland, to admit and receive you Our said Lievtenant Governour, according to this Our Commission, and to obey and pursue your Order in all things, according to the Authority wee have given you; and likewise requiring and commanding Our Governour and Counsell of Virginia, and likewise all other Our loving Subjects of Virginia, to bee aiding and assisting to you, not onely to the settling and establishing of your Authority, as Our Lievtenant Governour of Maryland, but also in all such helps and assistances, as may be necessary for your preservation there, and for the mutuall good of both Plantations, as aforesaid.

Given at Our Court in Jersey the 16th day of February 1649-50, in the second year of Our reign.

LOG OF THE CHASSEUR.

JOURNAL

OF PRIVATE ARMED BRIG CHASSEUR, THO^s BOYLE, COM.
FROM NEW YORK ON A CRUISE.

II.

Monday 30 January 1815

At $\frac{1}{2}$ past Meridian discovered land on our Lee bow. Supposed it to be Martinique. At 1 P. M the North part bore South 8 leagues. The Frigate on our Weather quarter still in chase. At 2 P M the heavy and continual squalls greatly favoring the Frigate, she began to near us, insomuch as to make it necessary for us to heave 10 of our carronades overboard, also some of our Spare spars off the deck and start some of our water below. She still continuing firing her Guns of her Fore Castle, got our 2 long 12^s aft. Sawed down the taffrail and gave the guns more Room, and commenced firing at her from our Stern Ports, apparently with some execution. At this time dropping her fast. At 3 P. M made an hermaphrodite Brig on our Starboard bow. At 3.30 she passed our Bows steering SE. and hoisted a Swedish Flag. At 4 P. M North part Marte bore SE 4 miles. At 7 P. M lost sight of the Frigate and haul'd up SSW and after SSE. Daylight, Martinique in sight. At 7 A M North West and E by N distant 10 leagues. At the same time made a sail on our Lee Bow bearing SSW. Coming up with her fast, find her to be a Brig under a press of Sail standing about West. At 11 A M the Chase hoisted Spanish Colours and on our firing a Gun to Leeward hove to and we soon after came up and boarded her
Lat ob 13. 07 North

Tuesday 31st January 1815

Commences fair and pleasant Weather with moderate trade

Winds. Lying to, overhauling the Brig, which proves to be a Spaniard from Cadiz and bound to Laguaira. At 2.30 dismissed him and filled away and made sail. At 6 P. M reefed Fore and Main Topsail and Main sail

Midnight, Fresh Breezes and flawy. At 10 A. M the West end of St. Vincents bore E. by N. 6 or 7 leagues distant. Made a Sail on our Weather bow nearly ahead. Made sail in chase

Lat. by ob. 13. 14 North

Wednesday 1st February 1815.

Commences with Moderate Breezes and fair Weather. In chase of the Sloop to Windward. At 1.30 tacked Ship to the N E. At 3.30 the breeze increasing and we gaining on her fast, she hoisted Swedish Colours and soon after hove to, when we came up and boarded her and found her to be of and for St Bart^s from Trinidad in ballast. At 4.20 P. M. discharged her. At the same time discovered two sail on our Weather bow. When we sail upon a Wind in chase of the largest, a Ship steering West, the other a small sloop steering southerly. The SW end of St Vincents SE by E and E 5 leagues. At 7 fired a Gun at the Ship when she took in her studding sails and rounded to. We hoisted a signal which she not answering gave her another Gun, upon which she hoisted a Lantern. We then steered athwart his stern, hailed and ordered him to send his Boat on board, which order he complied with. We also sent an officer on board him to overhaul. She proved to be the Ship *Sarah Maria* Captain Itter of and from Rotterdam for Curaçoa 38 days. Cargo Sundries.

Midnight good breezes and pleasant. At 6 A. M land in sight to windward bearing about East.

Meridian North part of St. Vincents, bore East distant 8 leagues. Ends light winds nearly Calm. Employed in setting up the fore Rigging and other Jobs of Ship's duty

Lat. obⁿ 13. 17 North

2^d Feb. 1815

Commences with light Winds and pleasant Weather. At 5

P M the South part of St. Vincents bore E by N distant 11 leagues.

At 10 A M. tacked to the Northward. Midnight fine Breezes and clear moonlight. Working to Windward and tacking every two hours through the night.

At daylight the Granadillos Islands to windward. At 10 A M being in with the Granadillos made all sail in chase and soon after discovered her to be a Ship standing in a direction towards Granada. At 11 A M made Granada ahead, at the same time made another small sail on our Lee bow Ends pleasant

Friday 3^d Feb. 1815

At 1 P. M could plainly discern the Ship we were in chase of was a Merchantman, apparently English. Called all hands to quarters and got all Clear for Action, and loaded the Guns with round and Grape. At 2 P M drawing close to the Ship and the Land both, fired a Shot ahead and hoisted our Colours. She immediately hoisted English Colours and commenced at us, which we returned. At 2.15 she struck her colours and we ceased firing, having all her sails set studding sails &c. Hailed the Ship and requested the Captain to lay his head to the Southward, he said his men were all run below from fear. I assured him, that if they came on deck not a man of them should be hurt. He called the Men on Deck under the pretence of wearing and put her before the wind for the purpose of running her. We having shot considerably ahead made sail immediately and closed with him, and in about 10 Minutes layed him alongside and boarded him, his Men having all run below. Got her around to Southward and stood from the Land, it being about half a Mile off. The Ship proved to be the *Corunna* of and from London bound to Grenada with Coal as Ballast and some Articles of hardware. She was commanded by Captain Dempster, mounted 8 Guns and 18 Men. Took out all the prisoners and sent Mr. John Powers Prize Master and 11 Men to take her to the United States. Midnight bore up and run West under easy sail. At 8 A M discovered a Ship on the Weather bow, apparently a Ship run away before the wind.

Made sail in chase. Made a Convoy; counted 110 sail, the London Convoy. The Ship we supposed to be the convoy Ship, a Frigate. At 10 A M. The Frigate gave chase to us. Hove about and stood for her. After a little time she hove about and stood for the Convoy. We hove about and stood for the convoy also. Meridian, supposed the Island of Grenada bore East 15 leagues.

Lat. ob. 12. 20 North

Saturday 4th Feb. 1815

Begins with fine Breezes and Smooth Sea. All sail set in chase of the Convoy. The Frigate under easy sail. At 5 P. M close to Convoy and very near the sternmost Vessels. At the time the Frigate set every necessary Sail that she could and gave us chase. Tacked Ship and stood from her. At 7 lost sight of her. Bore up to the Westward and then hauled to the North and westward. Midnight pleasant. At Daylight saw a Ship bearing about SSW and the Convoy about North. At 8 A M close to her. She hoisted English colours and upon our hoisting the American Flag, she struck. Out boat and boarded her. She proved to be the Ship *Adventure* of London, Captain Crocker from London to Havanna with Ballast and Iron Work. She had 4 Guns and 14 Men. Took out the Prisoners and several small Articles and manned her for the United States. At Meridian we parted Company and went in chase of the Convoy, which we understand is bound for Havanna, Jamaica &c.

Sunday 5th Feb^y 1815

At 5 P. M under the Convoy bearing about N. by W. steering NNW. At Night carrying all sail necessary, at daylight nothing in sight. At 8 A M made the Convoy again steering more to the Northward. Several Vessels appeared to be detached from the Convoy, steering more to the Northward. Gave chase immediately. At 11 A M could plainly discern six Ships and two Brigs had separated from the Convoy for another destination, one of the Brigs apparently a Man of War. At Meridian gaining

fast on the Convoy, could discover 4 Ships apparently well armed and the two Brigs. They kept close together and made every preparation to engage us.

Ends carrying all necessary Sail in chase.

Lat. ob 14. 53 North

Monday 6th Feb^y 1815

Commences fine weather and Moderate Winds. At 3 P M drawing close up on the Weather quarter of the Eight Vessels. Got all clear for Action. At $\frac{1}{2}$ past 3 hoisted our colours and gave a Shot at the first Brig. Our Shot was immediately followed by the Stern chasers of the 4 Ships at us. Sheared closer to and kept firing at them endeavouring by several manœuvres to separate them; they however kept in close order firing frequently at us. We still kept dogging them drawing their fire. Discharged several of our Broad Sides at them. They sent many shot thro' the Sails and Shot away the Main top Gallant Mast. At 6 P. M made another trial to Leeward, but finding their keeping close would in fact prevent our doing anything with them, tried again to separate them but to no purpose. Kept close to them in hopes they would Separate. Bore up on them again and received several Shots but could not effect a Separation.

Midnight watch them sharp. Daylight the whole Eight in sight. Dogged them till 8 A. M. A strange sail at this time made its appearance to Leeward. Up in chase. Meridian lost sight of them. The Islands of Porto Rico and Morra in sight. Ends pleasant Breezes &c.

Tuesday 7th Feb^y 1815

Begins with fine Breezes and pleasant weather. At 3 P. M. Morra bore N E distant 5 leagues. Coming up with the chase which appeared to be a Pilot boat vessell apparently a Privateer. At 4 P. M she hoisted Carthagea Colours. We spoke her and sent the boat on board. She proved to be a Privateer from Carthagea on a cruise. At 6 P M bore up before the wind, the Privateer also.

Midnight squally with rain. At Day light saw the Carthaginian astern, all sail set before the Wind. Ends squally rainy weather and heavy swell from the Eastward.

Lat. by ob. 17. 17 North

Wednesday 8 Feb^y 1815

Commences fine Breezes and pleasant Weather. Running down before the wind with all sail set. At 4 P. M. made Altwalla Rock nearly ahead; at the same time made Islands Benta and St. Domingo. At 6 P. M Altwalla bore WNW 2 leagues distant.

Middle part squally with Rain. At day light saw the convoy on our Lee beam. Took in Fore top Gallant sail, reefed Fore top sail and hauled by the wind. At 8 saw point Abbaco bearing North 8 leagues dist. At 8 jibed Ship and haul'd on a Wind to N. E.

Meridian all necessary sail set by the wind. Ends pleasant. Employed at sundry jobs of Ship's duty.

Thursday 9th Feb^y 1815

Commences with light showers of Rain, the convoy in sight to westward. At 3 P. M. jibed Ship. At 6 the Island of St. Domingo to the North and the Convoy in sight to westward. At 8 P M lowered the Main sail down, and set studding sails each side below and aloft.

Midnight fine Breezes. At 3 A. M. shortened sail. At day light made the convoy close to us. Discerned a sail. Made all sail in chase. At 11 A M could discover her to be a Ketch apparently English. At Meridian coming up with the chase fast. She appeared to be Armed. Ends clear and pleasant. Lost sight of the Convoy.

Lat. by obn. 16. 46 North

Friday 10th Feb^y 1815

At 2 P. M. coming up with the chase, she hoisted English Colours and hauled up his Foresail. We hoisted our colours and

running alongside fired a Volley of Musketry into her, when she struck. She proved to be the Ketch *Martin* from Kingston, Jamaica, and bound to Araba. Took out the Prisoners and some Provisions &c and burnt her.

Middle part Moderate breezes and pleasant. At 7 A. M. made a sail on our weather beam. Made all sail in chase. At 8 A. M. made another sail 3 points afore the weather beam. Latter part fresh Breezes and Squally with smart showers of Rain. Ends in chase of the first sail, a Schooner.

Lat. obⁿ 17. 20 North

Saturday 11 Feb^{ry} 1815.

Begins fresh breezes and squally with heavy Sea. At 1.40 P. M. the Chase hoisted Spanish Colors and bore up for us. She was from Kingston Jam^a bound to the City of St. Domingo. Put 4 Prisoners from on board Ketch *Martin* on board of her and made Sail to the Westward in quest of two Sail. At 3 P. M. Cape Liberoon bore ENE 11 leagues. At half Past 3 made the sail to leeward again carrying all Sail in Chase. At 7 lost sight of the Chase.

Midnight squally with Rain. At Daylight fill'd away and made Sail. A Sail in Sight on the N. W quarter. Made Sail in Chase and Soon after discovered her to be standing for us when we tacked. At same time saw East End of Jam^a bearing N by W. At 11 A. M. made a Small Sail to windward running down before the wind, apparently a small sch^r with square Sail set.

Ends fresh breezes and squally with heavy sea and some Rain.

Lat. obsⁿ 17. 55 North

Sunday Feb^{ry} 12, 1815

Commences fresh breezes and squally. Beating to windward in Sight of Jam^a. At 1 P. M. brought to the small sail a Sch^r under Spanish Colours. Out Boat and boarded her. While overhauling her made another sail to windward running down. At 2 P M discharged the Schooner. The Last Sail, a small schooner also, coming down upon us hoisting Spanish Colours and hove to. Out

Boat and Boarded him. He was from Porto Rico bound to Kingston Jam. At 3 discharged him and made sail by the wind. At 4 bore up before the wind to the Westward. At 5 brought to a small Sloop under English Colours from Kingston bound to Turk's Island in Ballast. At 6 P. M discharged her. At same time Morant Point bore SW 5 leagues distance. At daylight saw a large ship bearing NE. Light winds inclining to Calm. Tacked and made sail in Chase. At 9 the Chase, a Ship, hoisted English Colours aft and a signal forward. At this time Arenatta Bay bore South 3 or 4 leagues distance

Lat obs^d 13. 40 North

Monday Feb^y 13, 1815

At half Past M running up along side the Ship hoisted the Yankey flag, when she struck. Boarded her, and found her to be the *Mary and Susanna*, King, from London for St Anns Jam. Cargo sundries, say dry goods and 6 guns and 22 men. Took out the Prisoners, and commenced taking out the Cargo. At 6 P M Aranatta Bay bore South 11 Leagues Distance. Put Mr. Coffin and a prize Crew on board and ordered her to keep Company with us. Steering all night to the West.

Middle part squally with rain. At daylight the Island of Cuba in sight. Light weather. At 8 A M Cape Cruz bore NNW dist 9 leagues. Commenced taking out Cargo from the Prize again and stowing it away in us

Meridian pleasant. Continuing to take out goods from the Prize

Tuesday 14th February

Begins moderate winds and Cloudy. Laying to taking out goods from the Prize. At 6 P. M Cape Cruz bore North 8 leagues Dist. At 7 fill'd away under Short sail in company with the Prize, standing to the Westward. Midnight squally. Daylight nothing in sight. Began to take out Cargo from the Prize, laying by for that Purpose. At Meridian saw Cape Cruz bearing NE 10 leagues dist. Ends high winds and Cloudy

Lat^d Obs^d 10. 29 North

Wednesday 15th 1815

Begins light winds and squally. Lying by in Company with the Prize.—At 6 P. M. parted Company with the prize, both of us making all necessary sail to the Westward. At 8 A M. made the land on our weather bow and hauled up for it. Found it to be the Cayman Brake and soon after saw the little Cayman Island

At Meridian West end little Cayman bore N. E. 8 Leagues distance. Ends Moderate breezes and pleasant weather. Employ'd at Sundry jobs of Ship's duty

Lat. obs^d 19. 36 North

Thursday 16th 1815

At 3 P. M made 3 Sail bearing S E. Made all sail in Chase. At 4 P. M. came up with and boarded them, 2 Ships under Hamburg Colours and a Brig under Russian Colours, all bound to the Havanna from St. Thomas. At 8 P. M. discharged two of the Vessels, on board of which by permission of the Cap^t put 7 Prisoners, officers of Different Prizes. At 11 P. M. discharged the other Ships on board of which (by permission) we put 4 prisoners . . . Midnight moderate breezes and cloudy. At 3 A M wore Ship, head S E. At 6 A M saw the Island of Grand Cayman bearing North distance 4 leagues. At 10 hove to close in shore on the S W side of the Island and sent 3 Boats on shore with 31 Prisoners near Georgetown and Gave them four barrels of Provision. Meridian pleasant. Ends cloudy, lying to near the Land

Friday February 17th 1815

At 1 P. M fill'd away and stood to the Southward under easy sail. At 4 P M SW part of Grand Cayman bore E by S dist 6 leagues

Midnight squally with rain. Daylight nothing in Sight. Moderate wind and Cloudy. Every drawing sail set

Meridian clear and pleasant weather, with moderate trade winds. Carrying all necessary Sail. Employ'd at sundry jobs of Ship's duty

Latitude obs^d 20. 48 North

Saturday 18th Feb^r 1815

Commences moderate winds with clear and pleasant weather, all necessary sail set. At 6 P M shorten'd sail

At 8 A. M saw 3 sail bearing about NE.

Meridian made the land bearing WNW. Ends light airs of wind from the Eastward. Employ'd scraping and painting the vessel outside and sundry other jobs of Ship's duty.

Lat^d Obs^d 21. 34

Sunday 19th Feb^r 1815

Begins light winds and sultry weather. All necessary sail set, standing in for the land. At 4 P. M. saw a low point of land bearing WNW at same time could distinguish the three sail in sight to be the same which we boarded on the 16th inst bound to the Hav^r. At 6 P. M tack'd Ship, Cape Coruntes then bearing S. E dist. 5 miles, and the False Cape WNW 6 leagues. Took in foresail and fore Royal and backed the Topsail. Drifting S. W $\frac{1}{2}$ Knot p^r Hour. Daylight nothing in sight. Fill'd away and made sail by the wind to the NW. At 6 A M saw the land bearing NW to ENE. Cape Antonia bearing W b N $\frac{1}{2}$ N. At 10 being close in with the land sent 2 Boats on shore to look out for water. Ends pleasant, lying to for the Boats.

Lat^d Obs^d 21. 50 North

Monday Feb^r 20th 1815

A few minutes past Meridian made a sail in the SW quarter, when we made a signal for the Boats, which signal being promptly attended to, we were soon after under a press of sail in Chase. Gaining on the Chase find her to be a Sch^r standing to the SE. At 2 P. M. Cape Antonio bore N. by W $\frac{1}{2}$ W 6 or 7 Leagues dist. At 2.40 the Chase in stud^s sails &c. and haul'd by the wind. At 3 hoisted Spanish King's Colours and soon after (we being nearly within musket shot) she hove to. She appeared to be a fast sailing pilot boat schooner. Boarded her and found her to be from Campeache for St Iago de Cuba. Cargo Indigo Logwood

&c. Took out 7 Serons of Indigo, which were for English Acct. At 6.30 suffer'd her to proceed.

Midnight Moderate winds and clear weather. Made the land ahead, and tacked to the Southward. Same time backed Main Top Sail. At 4 A. M fill'd away and stretch'd off to the south^d. At 5 tack'd again and stood in for the land.

Meridian pleasant weather. Close in with the Cape Antonio. Sent 2 Boats on shore.

Lat^d Obs^d 21. 50 North

Tuesday 21st Feb^{ry} 1815

Commences moderate breezes and pleasant weather. Laying off and on the Cape. At 3 P. M. the Boats returned on board bringing a great quantity of excellent Crawfish, some sea Fowl &c. At 5 stood off from the Land. At 6 Cape Anto. bore N by W $\frac{1}{2}$ W 3 leagues dist. At 10 fresh breezes. Shortened Sail. Midnight pleasant, standing off and on Shore alternately thro the night. Daylight nothing in Sight. At 6 A. M. made the land bearing from NE to NW by W. At 7 being close in with Middle Cape jibed Ship and stood down along Shore

At meridian Cape Antonio bore North 4 leagues distance. Ends pleasant weather. Employ'd at Sundry jobs Ship's Duty

Latt^d obs^d 21. 46 North

Wednesday 22nd Feb^{ry} 1815

Begins fresh breezes and clear weather. Laying off and on in Sight of Cape Antonio. At half Past 3 p. m breeze freshening on us, and a considerable swell running. Housed the Guns on both sides. At 4 standing to the Southward on the larboard Tack, made a Sail on our weather bow, apparently before the wind, Cape Ant^e then bearing NW by N 4 or 5 leagues distance. At 6 took in main Top Sail and took a 2nd Reef in fore T. Sail. Gaining on the Chase make her out a small Felucca Rigged Vessel standing to the Southward. At 7 lost sight of her and tacked to the Northward.

Midnight more moderate. At 1 A M. wore Ship, head SW

and at 4.30 wore to the Northward. At daylight 10 or 12 sail in Sight to the South^d. Directly afterwards discovered near one hundred sail. Middle Cape then about NNW dist. 6 or 7 miles. Bore up and run to the NW. At 8 Cape Anto bore S SE 1 mile distance. At 9 hove to head NE. At 10 fill'd away. Ends fresh breezes lying by. Some of Convoy in Sight astern

Lat^d Obs. 22. 19 North

Thursday 23rd Feb^ry 1815

Begins moderate and fair, under short sail standing to the Northw^d. About 100 Sail in Sight to the Southw^d. At 6 P. M the body of the convoy bore SE by S. No land in sight. A few minutes before 8 tack'd to the NE. At 10 saw the Convoy again. Midnight as before. Daylight all the Convoy in sight standing to the NE. At 8 A M came up nearly within gun shot of the convoy and continued to manoeuvre in such a manner as to be Enabled to reconnoiter them. At 11 A M the commodore's Ship, a 74, gave Chase to us, but finding we beat her with ease, she gave up the chase and tack'd Ship for the Convoy, which bears about ENE in sight from aloft. At the same time leaving a Ship under our Lee, apparently a Sloop of War. Ends pleasant. Employ'd at Sundry Jobs.

Latt^d Obs^d 23. 16 North

Friday 24th February 1815

Commences Moderate Winds and fair Weather, all the convoy in Sight. At 5 P. M tack'd to SW. steering that Course half an hour. At 5.30 tack'd to the N. E. At 11 P. M. Convoy in sight off the Lee quarter. Midnight as before, but no Ships in Sight. Hove the mⁿ Topsail to the mast. 1 A M bore up and run down half an hour, when we again backed the main Top Sail, and at 2.30 A M. made the Convoy to the westward nearly in our wake. Kept sight of them until 3, when we fill'd away on a wind running ahead of them. At 5 tack'd Ship and stood to the Southward of the Convoy, which appeared close together and no stragglers. At 10 tack'd to the southward, passing close along by the whole Convoy reconnoitering them. At 11 tack'd to the NE.

Meridian all the convoy in Sight on our lee beam. Employ'd at Sundry Jobs of Ship's Duty.

Latt^d Obs^d 23. 49 North

Saturday 25th February 1815

Commences moderate. Standing to N. E., the Convoy close under our lee. At 3.30 P. M a Ship of War tack'd to the Southward, apparently in Chase of us. Tack'd at same time.

At 4 P. M. the Ship tacking we tack again also. At 5 squally with rain, head reach'd on the Ship very fast. At 8 lost sight of the convoy and made them again at 9.

Midnight as before. At 2.30 A M tack'd to the NE. Daylight the convoy in sight off our Bow. At 7 A. M tack'd to the Southward. At 8 A. M having a regular breeze employed trimming Ship by shifting Guns, men &c. heaving log at same time frequently. At 11 A M a strange Sail in sight to the Southw^d. Meridian light winds and fair weather. Convoy all in sight. Made the land bearing from SSE to SSW.

Latt^d Obs^d 23. 33 North

Sunday 26th Feb^y 1815

At half Past meridⁿ made a Sail nearly ahead, between us and the land; at 2 P. M made a Sail to windward apparently running down with the land; at 2.30 came up with and boarded her, a Spanish Sch^r from Hav^a for Matanzas in Ballast. Discharged her in a few minutes and kept away in order to get sight of the convoy again. 3.30 made two sail bearing North. Jibed Ship and hauled up for them. At 4 P. M the Pan of Matanzas bore S SE 6 leagues distance. Between 4 and 5 P. M. brought to and boarded both the above Vessels, a Spanish Sloop and Schooner from Hav^a bound to windward in ballast. At 6 P. M. bore up. Midnight squally, rain &c. Daylight nothing in Sight. 8 A M made the Land. At 9 bro^t to and boarded a Span. Sch^r from Hav^a to Matanzas in Ballast. At 10.30 made a sail to windward apparently a square Rigg'd Vessel running down with the Land

and soon after another sail farther to Windward. At 11.30 boarded the first sail. Russian Brig, from Havre de Grace (France) for Hav^a in Ballast. Discharged her in few minutes and made Sail in Chase of the other Sail; a Sch^t, apparently a long Pilot Boat built Vessel, running down before the wind.

Meridian. The chase in studding sails and hauld up a little. Harnea bearing about South, no great dist. off. Ends pleasant etc.

Monday 27th 1815

At $\frac{1}{2}$ past Meredⁿ Schooner hauld more to the Northw^d carrying a press of Sail. At this time also she carried away her Fore top mast, but very soon after cut and Cleard away the wreck of it. At $\frac{1}{4}$ before 1 P. M fired a gun and hoisted the Amⁿ flag to ascertain if possible the national character of the Chase. He showed no Colours but trimm^d his sails close to the wind. At 1 P. M drawing up to her very fast she fired a Stern Chase Gun at us and hoisted English Colors, shewing only 3 Ports in the side next to us. Under the impression that she was a Runner for the Hav^a, weakly arm'd and mann'd, used every effort to close with him as quick as possible. Saw but very few men on her deck. Hastily made but small preparation for Action expecting no fighting. The preparation was not complete at 1.25, being within Pistol shot of him, he opened a tier of 10 ports of a side and commenced firing his broadside. We immediately opened our Battery of great guns, and began with the musketry, and endeavoured to close for the purpose of Boarding. Moving quick at the time we shot ahead under her. He put his helm up for the purpose of sheering across our stern and giving us a raking fire, which was prevented by our timely noticing his intentions and put our helm up also. He gathered way, we closed within ten yards of him. At this time both fires were very severe and destructive and we found we had an heavy Enemy to contend with, his men having been concealed under the Bulwarks. Saw the blood run freely from her scuppers. Gave the orders for boarding, which was quick and cheerfully obey'd. At 1.40 put the helm to starboard and endeavored to lay her alongside. In

the act of boarding he surrender'd tho' M^r Christie got on board him. Out Boat and sent her on board. She proved to be H. B. Majesty's Sch^r *St. Lawrence*, Commanded by Lieu^t Ja^s E. Gordon, formerly the famous Private arm'd Schooner *Atlas* of Phil^a mounting fifteen guns, fourteen 12^{lb} Carronades and a long nine. Allow'd a complement of 75 men. Had on board a number of marines, and some Navy Gentlemen passengers bound to the Squadron off N. Orleans. By her Commander's report, having 6 men killed and 17 Wounded, many mortally, and by various other reports 15 Killed and 19 Wounded. She was a perfect wreck in her hull, and had scarcely a Sail or Rope standing. We suffered considerably in the Sails and Rigging; had 5 men Kill'd and 7 wounded, four very severely, that will be maim'd for life: their names are Tho^s Davis, Aquilla Weaver, Peter ——— and Yankey Sheppard.

Commenced taking out the prisoners and repairing Damages. Sent a Crew on board to assist M^r Christie in Keeping company with us for the Night. In the course of the night her main Top Mast fell over the side, and at light the Mⁿ Mast went by the Board. Sent the Boat on board at 9 A M to take a compleat survey of her. In the Course of the forenoon 3 of their wounded men died. Ends moderate. All hands Employ'd at Sundry Jobs. Took out some purser's Slops from the *St. Lawrence*.

Latt^d Obs^d 23. 57 North

Tuesday 28th Feb^r 1815

Begins light airs of wind and warm weather. At $\frac{1}{2}$ past M. finding the great trouble and inconvenience of sending the *St. Lawrence* to the U. States, as well as the danger, She being dismasted and otherwise a perfect wreck from the Action, from motives of humanity to their wounded and the solicitation of her officers, I agreed to make her a Flag of Truce to carry the wounded to the Hav^a to mitigate the sufferings of their unfortunate situation; the Commander of her pledging his most sacred Parole of Honour, as a British Officer for himself and in behalf of his other Officers, and wounded not to take up Arms against the

U. States, unless regularly exchanged, in the event of their recovering from their wounds. The legality of which, however, was to be left to his Government to decide.

At 1 P. M commenced putting on board the wounded we had taken out, and heaving overboard her Guns. At 4 P. M had finished with them and put on board twenty other Prisoners taken from different Vessels, and sent on board some Shirts and two Bales of purser's Slops for the comfort and convenience of the wounded and others. At 6 P M the commander in company with M^r Rapp, my officer to whom I had given charge of the flag, went on board. Tho' before leaving the *Chasseur* Lieut James E. Gordon late commander of the *St. Lawrence* express'd to me his gratitude for the generous, kind and humane treatment he and his surviving officers had experienced, acknowledging, that should it ever be our unfortunate lot to be captured during the present war, our treatment would not probably be as Satisfactory as his.

At 8 P. M. we both made Sail. Kept close to him all night. At 9 A M found them Rigging additional Masts on board the *St. Lawrence* to help her progress. People employed at sundry necessary jobs of Ship duty, such as repairing and bending new Sails and repairing the Rigging.

Latt^d. Obs^d. 24. 42. North.

Wednesday 1st March 1815

Begins squally. Employed fishing Main Boom which had been wounded by a round Shot in the late action. The Prize in sight in the NW quarter. At 2 P. M lost sight of her. At 4.30 a water spout pass'd very near us to leeward. At 5 a very fresh breeze from the N^d and W^d. Handed the Main and close reefed the Fore Top Sail, and sent down fore Roy^l and main Top. G. yds. Midnight light airs from NW and clear weather. Daylight squally with heavy showers of rain. At 6 A. M. made land to windward bearing ENE. Made sail by the Wind. At 6.30 made a Sail in the wake of the land. At 8 the weather clearing a little out Reefs and made all Sail requisite. 8.30 tack'd to NE. From 10 to 11 A. M Kept our Main Top-sail aback for the Sail

(a Ship) to come down on us, which she appears to be doing. At 11 fill'd away the main topsail and tack'd to S. E. keeping close on a wind. At this time finding the water discolored tried a cast of the lead and struck soundings in fathoms water [*sic*].

Meridian. Another Sail in sight. Ends cloudy. Employ'd as requisite.

Latt^d by an uncertain Obs^d 24. 34 North.

Thursday 2 March 1815

Begins Cloudy. Two sail in Sight to the Windward. 1 P. M. two more Sail in sight to the Northw^d. At 2 P. M. tack'd to the SE when one of the Sail an hermaphrodite Brig haul'd by the Wind, apparently in chase of us. At 2^h 30^m the Ship keeping in such Shoal water as to prevent our approaching her, back'd our Mⁿ Top Sail for her to come down to us. At 6^h 30^m boarded her and found her to be from Cadiz, bound to Havⁿ out 74 Days. 6.30 discharged the Ship and fill'd away by the Wind to the N^d and W^d. Midnight pleasant weather.

At 1.30 A. M. sounded in 10 fathoms water, and afterward continued to sound occasionally thro' the Night. At daylight found ourselves near the Bemini Isld and haul'd off NW. At 8 made a Sail ahead standing by the Wind to the South^d which we soon discovered to be our prize, the *St. Lawrence*. Came up and boarded her.

Meredⁿ still in company. The NW part of the Bemini Isld. bore S. E by E dist 4 Leagues

Latt^d Obs^d 25. 46 North

Friday 3rd March 1815

Commences with fresh breezes and fine weather. At 1 P. M. Saw the great Isaacs bearing ENE. At 6 P. M. NE saw G. Isaacs bore SE by S 2 leagues.

Midnight Moderate Winds and pleasant. Lying by with the head yards aback.

Daylight nothing in Sight. Meridian light winds and pleasant. Ends lying by. Employ'd as requisite.

Latt^d Obs^d 27. 21 North.

Saturday 4th March 1815

Commences Moderate Winds and fine Weather. Lying by drifting along the Channel.

At 3 A. M fill'd away the head yards and Back'd the Mⁿ Top sail.

At 6 A. M. saw a sail on our weather bow, a Brig standing to the Southw^d under a press of Sail. Set all necessary Sail by the Wind in Chase. At 8 A M tack'd Ship; at 9 brought to the Brig, a Russian, from St. Petersburg, via Brook Haven Ireland (where she put into in distress) and bound to Amelia Island. Cargo, Iron &c.

Meridian discharged her. Ends pleasant. Employd at sundry jobs.

Latt^d. Obs^d. 29. 27 North.

Sunday 5th March 1815

Begins moderate and fine weather. At 1 P. M. fell in with a spar. Out Boat and towed it along side when we found it to be the Mⁿ Boom of *St Lawrence*—having no occasion for it, left it adrift.

Midnight as before

Daylight nothing in Sight. All this 24 hours under Short Sail, Mⁿ Top Sail aback, endeavoring to forelay for the Convoy which we supposed to be to the Southw^d of us.

Meridian pleasant. Employd drying Studding Sails &c.

Latt^d. Obs^d. 29.. 58 North.

Monday 6th of March 1815

Begins pleasant weather, Lying with Mⁿ Top Sail aback. At 1.30 p. M. tack'd Ship to S. W. making all necessary Sail. At 4.30 made a Sail about 2 points on our weather bow apparently by the wind. At 5 made another Sail 3 or 4 points on the weather bow. At 6.15 lost sight of both sail and tack'd to the SE At 7 Shortened sail. Squally with rain.

Midnight clear weather still under Short Sail.

Daylight nothing in Sight. At 9.40 A. M. Peter died of the wounds which he received in the late Action with the *St. Lawrence*. Meridian fine. Moderate weather. Under Easy Sail. Employed as requisite.

Latt^d. Obs^d. 30. 00 N.

Tuesday 7th of March 1815

Begins light Winds and fair weather under easy sail. Midnight as before. Top Sail settled down on the Cap. At 2 P. M took in Mⁿ. Top Sail, and let go her F Top Sail and F Top Mast Stay Sail. Daylight moderate Breezes and Cloudy, took 2 Reefs in F. Top sail. At 9 A. M. coming on to blow fresh with rough Sea, hous'd all the guns, and sent down F Royl and Mⁿ Top Gal' ydⁿ and hous'd F Royal mast.

Meridian Still Blowing fresh. Under close Reef'd Top Sails and F. Top Mast Stay Sail.

No Observation

Wednesday 8th March 1815

Commences fresh breezes and Rough Sea. Under Short Sail.

At 3 P. M set Storm Trysail.

At 6 set the Lug fore Sail with a reef in it

At 10 handed the Fore Top Sail

Midnight more Moderate, with increasing Sea. At 1 A. M the Stern Boat striking adrift, cut away the davit falls and let her go. Daylight, weather as above, Nothing in Sight. At 10 A M made a Sail about 4 Point on the weather Bow, which we soon discover'd to be a Brig apparently standing for us. We bore up for about 20 minutes and then hauld by the Wind again. At Meridian Brig in Sight off our Weather quarters. Wore round on the other tack and made Sail in Chase. Ends fresh breezes and squally, with continued heavy swell from the NE

Latt^d. Obs^d. 30. 31 North.

Thursday 9th March 1815

Commences fresh breezes and cloudy with Rough Sea. The Chase in Sight on our weather Bow, we gaining on her.

At 6.30 coming dark and squally lost sight of the Chase. Midnight More Moderate weather, smoother Sea. Made more Sail. Daylight nothing in sight. Still cloudy but Moderate weather.

Meridian light winds and hazy Weather. All sail Necessary set. People employ'd at sundry and Necessary Jobs

Latt^d. Obs^d. 32. 5 North

Friday 10th March 1815

Commences light Winds and hazy Weather. All necessary Sail set.

Midnight light airs of Wind from the Northw^d and Westw^d. At 2 A M a good breeze springing up, tack'd Ship's head to the NE. In F Top Gallant Sail and flying Jib

Meridian light winds and pleasant Weather employed as requisite.

Latt^d. Obs^d. 33. 30 North

Saturday 11th March 1815

Commences light winds and hazey weather. At 6 p. M Nearly calm. At 8 haul'd up the square foresail and lowered down the Mⁿ Sail. Middle and Latter part calm, with hazy weather

Meridian as above. Employ'd repairing Sails and Sundry other Jobs

Latt^d. Obs^d. 33. 35 N.

Sunday 12th March 1815

Commences light airs from the Southw^d and hazy weather. All necessary Sail Set.

Midnight Moderate breezes and cloudy. At 2 A M brisk Gales and clear weather. At 4 Took a Reef in the Main Top Sail.

Daylight nothing in Sight. Warm and hazy weather. Meridian light winds, and ditto weather.

Latt^d. Obs^d. 35.. 55 North

Monday 13th March 1815

Commences light winds, and warm hazy Weather. Water heat by Thermometer 76°.

Daylight, winds light and foggy. Water apparently discoloured and colder than the air by more than one Degree p^r Thermometer, from whence we Judge ourselves on the Edge of Soundings. At 4 A. M. the Thermometer fell to 70° in the Water. At half past 4 the Therm^r in the Water fell to 60°.

Latt^d. Obs^d. 37. 42 North

Tuesday 14th March 1815

Commences with Moderate breezes and hazy weather. All Sail Set. At 2 P. M the breeze freshening, took in fore Top Mast and Top Galt Studding sail. At 2.30 Reef'd Main Top Sail. At Midnight took in Sail. Tried for Soundings; got no Bottom. At 1 A M handed the Mⁿ Top Sail and sent down Mⁿ Top Galt yard. Blowing very fresh and squally. At 2 handed square fore Sail and took the 3rd Reef in the Mⁿ Sail. At 3 handed Fore Top Sail. At 4 sent down the Mⁿ Yard and Rigg'd in Flying Jib Boom. Daylight more moderate, with heavy Swell. At 10 made 2 Sail to leeward and 1 to windward. Made more Sail. At 10.30 made another Sail on our lee bow; all apparently Square Rigg'd Vessels. A Brig and Ship in Sight to Leeward. And an Hermaphrodite Brig on our weather quarter apparently in Chase of us. Ends light Winds and rough Sea.

Latt^d. Obs^d. 39. 0°6 North

Wednesday 15th March 1815

Begins light winds and Smooth Sea.

At 1 P. M shortened Sail and hove to for the Brig to windward (a clump Merchantman) to come down to us. At 2 P. M. boarded the Brig, she proved to be the *Eliza Ross* 2 Days out from Boston for Richmond. She informed us of a peace having been Signed by the President on the 17 Ult. At 2.30 up helm and made all Sail for the Chesapeake. At 4 Saw a Sail bearing SE of us. At 6 pass'd close by a Brig on the other Tack standing to the SE.

Midnight fresh breezes shortened Sail as occasion required. Daylight still blowing fresh under reef'd Sails At 8 A M got Soundings in 65 fathoms fine grey sand. Meridian More Moderate Weather but still blowing fresh and cloudy. People employed as required.

Latt^d Obs^d 38. 25" North

Thursday 16th March 1815

Begins Moderate breezes and cloudy. All Necessary Sail set. At 4 P. M tack'd Ship to the S. W. At 6 saw a Sail ahead. Nearly Calm. At 8 saw a light bearing WNW. Same time sounded in 20 fathoms water. Midnight moderate winds and clear weather sounding frequently in 18 Fathoms Water.

At 3 the breeze scanting, Shook the reefs out of the Main Top Sail. Daylight set lower Top mast and Top Gal^t Studding Sails. sent the Mⁿ Top Gal^t yard up and set the sail. Several small Vessels in sight in dif^t quarters. Wind very light At 11 boarded a sloop from Fredericksburg for N York. Got some newspapers from him. In 14 faths Water

Latt^d Obs^d 37. 23" North

Friday 17th of March 1815

Commences light winds and fair weather ; several Sail in Sight. At 1 P. M saw bearing about NW. [*sic*]. At 4 scaled off the guns. At 7 made Cape Henry Light House about 2 points on the lee bow. At 9 being in 8 fathoms Water bore up for the light and fired a Gun as a Signal for a pilot, after which we hoisted a light, and fired several Guns at intervals.

At 11 made Old Point Comfort light bearing NW. Midnight Moderate breezes and clear. At 2 A M Anchored in 6 fath^r water, near the Wolf Trap. Daylight fresh breezes and cloudy. No pilot Boat in Sight. At 6 hove up the Anchor and made all Sail up the Bay. Latter part fresh Breezes with Rain. Made and Shortened Sail as requisite

Meridian light winds abreast of Point Lookout

Custom House Baltimore

Con^{ts} Off^{rs} April 20. 1816

We John Dieter first Lieu^t of the Brig *Chasseur* and H. P. Cathell Prizemaster of the same vessel, on the cruise of which the preceding journal purports to be account of the proceedings with and on board said Brigantine, do solemnly sincerely and truly swear that the statement under the dates of the twenty seventh and twenty eighth February 1815 recounting the transactions on board and particulars of an engagement with his Brittannic Majesty's schooner *St. Lawrence* and the immediate subsequent proceedings respecting the captured vessel, her officers, crew and passengers, is a just and true report of the same as all actually occurred, to our knowledge and belief. The same being in the handwriting of Cap^t Thomas Boyle Commander of the s^d brig *Chasseur*, known to the said John Dieter : and that Cap^t Boyle is now absent on a Voyage at Sea.

JOHN DIETER
H P. CATHELL

Sworn

Ja^s U. McCulloch
Coll^r

THE CHEVALIER D'ANNEMOURS.

The greater part of the following biographical sketch is taken from a "Notice sur le Chevalier Charles François Adrien Le Paulmier d'Annemours, Consul Général de France à Baltimore," furnished by the French Embassy at Washington, to Mr. William Peynaud, for the Maryland Historical Society in the year 1896.

The information in this "Notice" is derived from documents on file in the Department of Foreign Affairs in Paris, and the rest of this sketch is derived from newspapers of the time during which M. d'Annemours was in Baltimore, Journals of Congress, and the Autobiography of Charles Biddle.

Charles François Adrien Le Paulmier d'Annemours was born in Normandy about 1742. His father was a noble, but poor, and when Charles reached the age of twelve years, he was sent off, on a merchant ship bound to Martinique, with a venture valued at 600 francs for his whole fortune.

It would seem that he succeeded fairly well in making his way in the world, for in about ten years he returned to France and went to see his family in Normandy; but he was not well received by them, or at least not well enough to induce him to stay long with them, for he went to England and spent two years in studying the English language, which he learned to speak and write fluently and correctly.

He returned to the West Indies in the year 1768, and during the next four years lived part of the time in the English Colonies, where he had many friends among the most influential inhabitants. The years 1772-3 he passed in the Colonies of England in North America, and in that time became well acquainted with their condition, and the ideas and feelings of the inhabitants.

In 1774 he returned to France, and this time, as will be seen, he was well received by some of his family, if not by all.

He was now about thirty-three years old, a man of ability, a

shrewd observer, and well qualified to speak about the causes of the trouble which was brewing between England and her Colonies.

As is well known, the Government of France was much interested in the state of affairs on this Continent, and was quite willing to see England embarrassed by a struggle with her American Colonies.

In 1776, a relative of M. d'Annemours, the Chevalier de la Luzerne, afterwards Minister to the United States, spoke to M. Vergennes, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, of the knowledge of the Colonies possessed by M. d'Annemours, and of the assistance he would be to M. Vergennes in acquiring a proper view of the condition of affairs in America. M. de Vergennes requested that M. d'Annemours should draw up a memorandum on the American question and submit the same to him.

It is supposed that this memoir is the one in *Memoirs and Documents, United States*, entitled "Memoir on the English Colonies, by the Chevalier d'Annemours." It was written in 1776 and in it M. d'Annemours set forth the resources of the Colonies, predicted "the interesting part they were destined to play in the world," pointed out the advantage that France had in sustaining the Revolution, and set forth the practical methods of conducting the war.

It would seem that at this time the Minister of Foreign Affairs had no intention of sending an envoy to Philadelphia, and only wanted to gain all the information possible in regard to the position and prospects of the Colonies, but M. d'Annemours wished to be sent out to the Colonies in some way as an agent of the French Government.

In October, the Chevalier de la Luzerne sent to M. Vergennes a new minute of d'Annemours entitled "An examination of some reasons which should determine France to make an alliance with the new American Republic," and said "I should be very glad if you could judge for yourself of his capacity and of the correctness of his views," and at the end of the letter "If you should find the minute which I sent you was important and required any fuller explanations, it would be a great pleasure to him to give them to you. He is absolutely ignorant that you have read his writings."

The decision of the Minister is shown by a memorandum at the bottom of a new memoir presented a little later to M. Vergennes, entitled "The scheme of conduct which the Chevalier d'Annemours proposes for himself during his sojourn in Philadelphia."

In it he asks to be sent to Philadelphia where he would present himself as a French officer travelling through the country attracted by the spectacle of the Revolution. He offered to keep the Government informed as to the inclinations of the Americans towards the European Powers, France especially, as to the secret representation of the European Governments near the American Government, on military operations, and on the general situation of the country. But he asked, as he had no resources except a sum of 4,000 livres which M. de la Luzerne was to send him from some unknown source, that the Minister would advance him some assistance. On the margin of this memoir is written, "The King not giving mission or commission to the Chevalier d'Annemours, his Minister cannot in any way take cognizance of the proposed journey except to oppose or forbid it."

Before the end of the year the Minister began to think differently of the matter, and sent for M. d'Annemours that he might learn more of his ideas and of his capacity for the position of Envoy.

According to M. d'Annemours a proposition was made to him that he should go to America as a secret agent of the French Government. At first he refused, but finally agreed to depart on his mission on condition that he should be permitted to take into his confidence General Washington and such members of the Congress as he should judge worthy to be intrusted with his secret.

He arrived at Boston in the beginning of the year 1777, whence he went at once to the headquarters of the American Army in order to confide his mission to General Washington. Later he confided it to Richard Henry Lee, then a member of the Congress from Virginia.

He then went to join the Congress at Philadelphia, and followed it in 1777 and 1778 wherever the movements of the armies forced it to go.

During this time he kept up a correspondence with the Ministry,

and endeavored to enlighten the French cabinet on the situation, in order to prevent any Anglo-American alliance.

"There is no choice," he wrote. "It is a question of consent or opposition to allowing England to put barriers and shackles on the commerce of Europe in all the seas of the globe; and of this be sure, that her reunion with her colonies on this continent will assure the success of an undertaking that her ambition keeping pace with her avarice cannot fail to suggest."

He had the satisfaction of seeing his views adopted by his Government, and in February, 1778, a "treaty of alliance was concluded between his Most Christian Majesty the King of France and the United States of America."

M. Gérard was appointed Minister Plenipotentiary by the French Government and brought with him authority to appoint provisional consuls to reside in the Colonies.

The number of French vessels which arrived at the port of Baltimore made it important that a Consular Agent should be established there, and accordingly that port was chosen as the place of residence of one of the first French consuls in the Colonies.

M. Gérard chose the Chevalier d'Annemours for this position, and in writing to the Minister of Marine (1st October, 1778) he said: "He (d'Annemours) is a man of ability, well informed, understands perfectly the English language, and has gained the esteem of very many of the most influential persons in this country. I venture to hope that his correspondence with you will convince you of the propriety of this choice."

The jurisdiction of this Consulate was shortly afterwards extended over Virginia and North Carolina in addition to Maryland, and in October, 1779, M. d'Annemours was appointed Consul General at Baltimore for the two Carolinas, Virginia, Maryland and Georgia. In writing to M. d'Annemours the Minister of Marine says: "The knowledge of the country which you have acquired, the proofs of zeal which you have given, and the good conduct which you have held during your residence in America, have determined his Majesty to make choice of you for this position."

In December, 1782, the Chevalier d'Annemours married Miss

Julia de Recour, from the West Indies. Of her Capt. Biddle says in his memoirs: "I had as passengers in the *St. Patrick* from Cape François two French ladies, mother and daughter, the mother a swarthy dame of about 40, and the daughter, a sprightly brown girl of 16, who came to join some relations in Baltimore. Soon after their arrival the daughter had the good fortune to attract the notice of the French Consul, who married her a few weeks later. She was a lively girl, who, when it was cold, would put on any of my clothes, dance on the quarter deck in them and perform some other monkey tricks which I suppose she thought there was no impropriety in."

The sprightly young girl, who became Madame d'Annemours, appears no more in this sketch, and when or where she died we know not, although we have good reason to believe that she was not living in 1792.

In 1784 the French Government changed its consular establishment in the United States, and ordered that for the future there should be one Consul General residing in Philadelphia, four consuls in different ports and five vice-consuls.

The Chevalier d'Annemours was continued as Consul at Baltimore, with jurisdiction over Maryland and Virginia, and having a Vice-Consul at Richmond.

When the French Revolution broke out, d'Annemours took the oath required by the French Assembly, and remained quietly at his post, until January, 1793, when M. Genet was sent out by the French Republic, charged with the direction of all the consular affairs in the United States, and among others, he suppressed the Consulate at Baltimore. Thus after fourteen years' service M. d'Annemours was left without any position or hope of preferment from France. He did not return to France. There was little to attract him in a country which he had left so young and seen so little of since his departure, even had it been the France which he knew in his youth.

He retired to his country seat, on the Harford Road, and there lived for some years quietly and peacefully, one of the people among whom he had so long lived, whose manners and customs were familiar to him, whose language he spoke and wrote with

ease, and where he was the object of neither observation nor jealousy.

It was here that he built the monument to the memory of Christopher Columbus, which can be seen from North Avenue near the Harford Road, and which is well cared for by the authorities of the Samuel Ready Orphan Asylum, the present owner of the ground on which the monument is built.

"The Corner Stone of an obelisk to honour the memory of that immortal man—Christopher Columbus—was laid in a grove in one of the gardens of a villa (Belmont, the country seat of the Chevalier d'Annemours near this town) on the 3rd of August, 1792, the anniversary of the sailing of Columbus from Spain," says a letter from Baltimore to Claypole's *Daily Advertiser*, a paper published in Philadelphia.

He left Baltimore about 1796, as in March of that year he sold his country seat in Baltimore county to Archibald Campbell.

The latter part of his life was spent in New Orleans, where he made a will in April, 1807, bequeathing his estate, which was quite large, to Madame Pitot, the wife of a Judge in New Orleans.

In 1821, a suit was begun (in France) between the Pitot heirs and a brother of the Chevalier d'Annemours, his legal heir—Denis Hector Le Paulmier d'Annemours—concerning property in France, owned at the time of his death by the Chevalier.

The exact date of his death is not known ; but it was probably in 1809, as the records of the District Court of New Orleans (*Wills*, Vol. I) show that the succession was opened in that year.

STRATEGY OF THE SHARPSBURG CAMPAIGN.

The military situation in Virginia on Sept. 2, 1862, excited the gravest apprehension in the North, while it brought exultation not unmingled with perplexity to the Confederates.

The consolidation of the three Federal corps in North Virginia under Pope and his advance against Richmond had ended in disaster far more speedy and serious than that which had befallen McClellan earlier in the summer. Pope had been forced from the Rappahannock, and though the Federal commander-in-chief had succeeded in hurrying up a part of McClellan's and Burnside's forces to his assistance, this had not been sufficient to prevent the overthrow of Pope at Manassas in the last days of August. Early in that month the two great Federal armies in Virginia had numbered 150,000¹ men. Fully the half of these, or about 80,000,² had been concentrated under Pope and had suffered defeat at Manassas. Some 20,000 to 25,000 more under Sumner and Franklin had reached Centreville on the evening of Aug. 30, and afforded a rallying point for the defeated army. This strong body of veterans gave consistency to Pope's crumbling forces. Their presence, together with the bold handling of Reno's and Kearney's troops at Ox Hill, Sept. 1, by which Lee's last thrust was parried, saved the Federal army from further loss and secured its retreat within the lines of Washington.

Though it thus appears that but half the Union troops in Virginia had been involved in Pope's defeat, the other half which had hurried from the Peninsula and other points to Washington was

¹ McClellan's returns for July 20 show that he had over 100,000 men "Present for duty." See *Report on the Conduct of the War*, part I, p. 344. Pope's return for July 31 shows over 50,000 men, present for duty. See *War Records*, Vol. 12, part 3, p. 523. See also Vol. II, *Papers of the Massachusetts Military Historical Society*.

² See Pope's *Army under Pope*, appendix E.

not in first-rate condition. Many had come from an unsuccessful campaign; they were being transferred from a general they loved to one they distrusted; they had been so hurried that in many cases they had outstripped their baggage and supply wagons and even their artillery. They had reached the Potomac to find the air filled with rumors of disaster, rumors which every hour converted into authentic statements. When the crowd of hungry and exhausted fugitives which soon lined the Potomac left no doubt as to Pope's fate, and interspersed their accounts of his campaign with curses loud and deep at that picturesque commander, no wonder that the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac were ready to despair, and that a feeling near akin to dismay pervaded the city of Washington. Unacquainted with the real slenderness of the Confederate resources, the danger seemed most grave, and all thoughts were turned to the salvation of the capital from the victorious forces of Lee. McClellan was restored to command, and charged to protect the city. His appearance at the head of the army did much to restore confidence, and he promptly set to work to place the abundant resources of the Federal government in a condition for use. From the 150,000 men now in and about Washington Secretary Stanton directed him to organize an army for active operations. McClellan's first object was to post his troops so as to secure the capital from attack, his next must depend upon the movements of his adversary. Such was the condition of affairs on the Union side.

Let us return to the other side, remembering that Lee was in the midst of that series of operations which taken together constitute his campaign of 1862. To the Confederates their very successes were to some extent embarrassing. The design of Lee in transferring his army from the James to the Rappahannock had been accomplished. Pope had been brought to battle and beaten before McClellan's main body could join him. Sanguine expectation could hardly have pictured greater success than had crowned the bold operations of Lee, Jackson and Longstreet; but with the retreat of Pope to the lines of Washington the campaign against him was ended, and what to do next, became the pressing question. Lee had entered upon the movement against Pope with

about 50,000¹ men, leaving some 20,000 about Richmond. The greater part of the latter had been ordered up during the campaign but they did not join Lee till Sept. 2. They fully made up for his losses in battle, but it is questionable whether they covered the additional losses from sickness and straggling which insufficient rations, bare feet and hard marching were already causing in his ranks. But what was Lee at the head of 80,000 victorious but ill-appointed soldiers and with no gun heavier than a 20 pounder Parrott to do? Plainly he was in no condition to move upon Washington where a line of heavy works armed with heavy guns and manned by three times his numbers awaited him. Nor was it easy to stay where he was, for the country around Centreville was exhausted of supplies, and but one railroad, and that badly damaged, led to his rear. A more serious objection to remaining at Centreville was that it meant inaction while his adversary recovered from the staggering blow just received and prepared without molestation another campaign against Richmond. In a few weeks, if Lee remained idle, a new Federal advance would certainly be organized, and whether made by way of the Rappahannock or of the lower rivers would force the Confederates back again to recover their capital. Still stronger seemed to Lee the reasons against falling back at once to the line of the Rappahannock. This was to throw away a great part of the results of the recent victory, give up a large section of North Virginia with its partly gathered harvests again to hostile occupation. None of these courses was possible to a general who, though too weak to attack such a place as Washington, was at the head of a successful army which his enemies had been unable to match in the open field. Lee's victories in the field had greatly depressed his enemies and had restored a great part of Virginia to his possession, and it was plainly his policy to compel the Federal army to further battle. As he was greatly outnumbered, he must divide his adversaries; he must keep up and increase, if possible, their apprehensions for the safety of Washington and thus detain a part of the Union

¹ See Col. W. H. Taylor's *Four Years with General Lee*, page 61. Also see *Historical Papers*, Vol. 8, pp. 178, 217.

army in the defensive lines of that city while he drew the other part away and fought it at a distance from supports and strongholds. The great object of all Confederate campaigns was, of course, not to capture cities but to cripple the opposing army. Every consideration, too, urged promptness of action in the present case. Whatever was to be done should be done while the Union army was still suffering from the blow it had received. In a few weeks the defeated army would be on its feet again and the resources of the Federal government would enable it to resume the offensive.

The best and most direct way of effecting the object now to be sought was to cross the Potomac and advance into Maryland. Lee could thus turn the more formidable of the defenses of Washington and threaten that city from its most vulnerable side. He would at the same time excite fears about the safety of Baltimore and Maryland, ill-affected as they were to the Union cause; and alarm Pennsylvania. No other course promised to hamper the Federal army so seriously. Large garrisons would be kept to secure the safety of Washington, Baltimore, and other important places, while public sentiment would demand that the remainder be promptly led against the invaders. Lee could then, probably choose his battle-field and fight when and where he thought best. The relief of Virginia for a time from military occupation, and the support of the Confederate army in a region not yet drained of supplies, were additional inducements of no slight importance. General Lee thus speaks of his proposed expedition into Maryland in his letter to Mr. Davis of Sept. 3: "The two grand armies of the United States that have been operating in Virginia, though now united, are much weakened and demoralized. Their new levies, of which I understood 60,000 men have already been posted in Washington are not yet organized, and will take some time to prepare for the field. If it is ever desired to give material aid to Maryland and afford her an opportunity of throwing off the oppression to which she is now subject, this would seem the most favorable.

"After the enemy had disappeared from the vicinity of Fairfax C. H. and taken the road to Alexandria and Washington I did

not think it would be advantageous to follow him farther. I had no intention of attacking him in his fortifications, and am not prepared to invest them. I therefore determined—if found practicable—to cross into Maryland. The purpose, if discovered, will have the effect of carrying the enemy north of the Potomac, and if prevented will not result in much evil.

"The army is not properly equipped for an invasion of an enemy's territory. It lacks much of the material of war, is feeble in transportation, the animals being much reduced, and the men are poorly provided with clothes, and in thousands of instances are destitute of shoes. Still we cannot afford to be idle, and though weaker than our opponents in men and military equipments, must endeavor to harass if we cannot destroy them. I am aware that the movement is attended with much risk, yet I do not consider success impossible, and I shall endeavor to guard it from loss."¹

The Confederate commander proceeded to execute his plans without loss of time. But one day's rest was allowed the tired troops, when the army was headed toward Leesburg, where it crossed and moved to Frederick city. D. H. Hill, who had just arrived from Richmond, led the way, Jackson followed, and Longstreet brought up the rear. Lee chose his crossing of the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge rather than west of it, because he would thus most distinctly threaten Washington and Baltimore, and hence the more certainly cause the withdrawal of the Federal army to the north side of the river, and the subtraction of large garrisons from it. This strategy was successful. By Sept. 7, the Confederate army was concentrated about Frederick and the mass of the Federal army was on the north bank of the Potomac. Lee's aggressive move threw the Federals completely on the defensive and occupied them entirely with the protection of the northern States and cities. His vigorous movements led to a greatly exaggerated estimate of his strength, and the uncertainty as to his objective point spread great alarm throughout Pennsylvania extending to Philadelphia. Governor Curtin, in addition to earnest appeals to the general government for aid, called out 50,000 State

¹ *War Records*, vol. 19, part 2, p. 590.

troops. To realize the success of Lee's strategy, glance for a moment at McClellan's dispositions to meet Lee's operations. On the second day after assuming command McClellan began to move his main body to the north side of the Potomac to meet the threatened invasion. He placed over 70,000¹ men under General Banks in and about Washington to defend the capital. General Wool with 10,000 or 12,000² more held Baltimore and the vicinity. After these large detachments, McClellan was still able to gather 85,000³ men with which he set forward towards Frederick to check the invader. Besides the Federal troops we have enumerated there was a body of 14,000⁴ at Harper's Ferry and Martinsburg concerned in this campaign. Now the problem before Lee was how best to deal with this large aggregate of hostile forces. By simply transferring his troops into Maryland he paralysed the one half of his opponents and reduced them to the condition of garrisons. There was left on his hands for the the time only the army under McClellan and the troops at Harper's Ferry.

For some days comparative quiet reigned. The Confederates, who had left behind at Leesburg their broken down men, horses and artillery, enjoyed much the two or three days of rest and the supplies which were obtained about Frederick, while General McClellan was rapidly reorganizing the forces with which he expected to attack the invaders. The Union Army moved out from Washington on Sept. 7, and by the 10th the Federal army stretched from the Potomac at Poolesville, across to New Market, covering thus both Washington and Baltimore. McClellan was inclined to move cautiously, and this tendency was increased by the apprehension of General Halleck, that Lee's irruption into Maryland was intended to cover a real movement against Washington on the south side of the Potomac. Such was the condition

¹ *War Records*, vol. 19, part 2, p. 336.

² *War Records*, vol. 19, part 2, p. 337.

³ General Palfrey's *Antietam and Fredericksburg*, p. 7.

⁴ The casualties of the Federal forces, at Harper's Ferry were 12,737 (*War Records*, vol. 19, part 1, p. 549), and the cavalry that escaped under Colonel Davis numbered about 1300.

of things on Sept. 10th, when General Lee began his movements for the reduction of Harper's Ferry.

When the Confederates crossed the Potomac they had expected that the garrison at Harper's Ferry and the troops which had fallen back from Winchester would retreat into Pennsylvania and rejoin the main body of the Federal forces around the left of the Confederate army. But General Halleck insisted that the garrison of Harper's Ferry should hold their post, and that the Winchester garrison should join them. As these troops amounted to but 13,000 or 14,000 in all, and Harper's Ferry was not provided for a siege, it is difficult to see what object the Commander-in-chief proposed to himself, but, whatever the object, this action on his part led to unforeseen and most important consequences. When Lee found after several days' stay in Maryland, that the troops at Harper's Ferry still held their position, he determined, while awaiting the slow advance of McClellan's army, to attempt the capture of the garrison and the considerable amount of ordnance stores which were known to be there. The means taken to secure the prompt and certain success of this enterprise were comprehensive, and involved the use of two-thirds of the Confederate army. Jackson, with 14 brigades, was directed by a rapid march to recross the Potomac at Williamsport, where after cutting off the retreat of the troops of Martinsburg, he was to drive these latter if possible to Harper's Ferry and occupy the region between the Potomac and the Shenandoah so as to prevent the escape of the garrison in that direction. The divisions of Anderson and McLaws (10 brigades) under the latter were ordered to move by way of Pleasant Valley upon Maryland Heights, the high mountain which from the Maryland side of the Potomac commands Harper's Ferry and everything else in the neighborhood and which was known to be fortified. General J. G. Walker with two brigades was to ascend the Potomac on the south side from the mouth of the Monocacy and occupy what are called the Loudoun Heights. McLaws was to prevent the escape of the garrison into Maryland and Walker to prevent it from making its way down the Potomac on the Virginia side. These troops once in position, the garrison would be completely hemmed in, and Harper's Ferry would be

untenable even had it been provisioned, for the mountain heights to be held by McLaws and Walker completely commanded the town and its environs. Lee expected McLaws and Walker to be in position by Friday the 12th, and Jackson by the 13th, and the reduction of the place, it was thought, would speedily follow. As soon as Harper's Ferry fell the troops engaged in these operations were to rejoin the remainder of the Confederate army in the neighborhood of Hagerstown. Lee retained the divisions of D. H. Hill and Longstreet (14 brigades) with the mass of his cavalry to watch the progress of McClellan and delay his advance until the reduction of Harper's Ferry should be effected. There was nothing in the movements of McClellan to cause the Confederate commander to apprehend any serious interference with his plans. The Federal Army was advancing very slowly. It was not Lee's desire to give battle in the vicinity of Frederick nor at the South mountain passes. On the contrary he sought to draw McClellan beyond the mountains and to fight in the Hagerstown Valley where the Union army would be further from the large forces in reserve at Washington. It would be some days before McClellan would know of the movements against Harper's Ferry and when these became evident they would be too near completion to be interfered with. The exposed condition of the garrison there seemed to offer an opportunity of striking a damaging blow at little cost and Lee determined to seize it.

The capture of Harper's Ferry consumed a day or two more than was expected. The swift-footed Jackson, to whom was committed the most difficult part of the enterprise and the general direction of affairs when all the bodies should be in position, made his circuit of 50 miles in the time assigned, having driven General White into Harper's Ferry and cooped up the garrison from the direction of the Shenandoah Valley by the evening of the 13th. Walker, however, did not occupy Loudoun heights until the morning of the 14th instead of the 12th. McLaws was delayed by the rugged country and by the resistance made by the Federal troops left to defend Maryland heights. He drove them down into the town on the 13th but did not succeed in getting his guns into position until the afternoon of the 14th. All being now ready Jack-

son pushed his batteries and a portion of his troops against the lines of his enemy during the night of the 14th, and prepared on the morning of the 15th to assault the Federal position, in conjunction with the Confederate batteries on the mountain tops. His attack was anticipated by the surrender of the place at 8 o'clock on the morning of the 15th. The captures comprised 12,500 prisoners, 73 guns, and a considerable amount of stores. All the garrison was captured except some 1300 cavalry under Colonel Davis. They had escaped during the night by a road at the base of the Maryland heights on the north side of the river, which McLaws had omitted to guard.

Let us turn back now to the important events which had taken place while these operations were in progress. On Sept. 13th occurred one of those accidents which now and then give an entirely unforeseen turn to military operations. The copy of General Lee's order (No. 191) addressed to General D. H. Hill, which detailed fully the movements of every division of the Confederate army during the operations about Harper's Ferry and the subsequent concentration near Hagerstown, had been lost in some way which has never been explained and was picked up and carried to McClellan, who by this time had reached Frederick. He rejoiced at the information which removed all doubts as to the designs of his enemy, and the movements of the Confederate army for days to come, and gave orders at once for a vigorous advance of his own forces. McClellan's aim was now two-fold: to relieve Harper's Ferry by breaking through and destroying that part of the line of investment under McLaws, while at the same time he intended to overwhelm the divisions under D. H. Hill and Longstreet which had been retained to confront him. The opportunity was a rare one. The Confederate army as a whole was much less numerous than the Federal troops (though McClellan would never believe it), but it was a veteran army, flushed with victory, and even with a reasonable estimate of its strength McClellan might well have hesitated to attack it when concentrated, with troops that had been so recently defeated. But Lee had now divided his army. Sixteen brigades out of forty were on the south side of the Potomac, which meant that they were two or three days

distant; ten others were among the mountains on the Maryland side where they could be hemmed in between the garrison at Harper's Ferry and McClellan's army; but fourteen brigades numbering some 12,000 to 15,000 men, and Stuart's cavalry, were in McClellan's front ready to dispute his advance. The immense advantage which the finding of Lee's dispatch gave to McClellan is seen at a glance when we compare his knowledge of the situation, and his course after getting it, with the cautious and vague directions he was at the same time receiving from his Commander-in-chief. When Halleck found that large bodies of Confederates were recrossing the Potomac into Virginia he took this as a confirmation of his fears of a sudden dash of Lee down the right bank of the Potomac against Washington and renewed his cautions on this head. McClellan knew now that there was no such danger to be apprehended. He knew that two-thirds of the Confederate army was actively engaged in the reduction of Harper's Ferry, and he knew that after this was accomplished, Lee intended to concentrate his troops around Hagerstown. It seemed to McClellan then, and it does seem now that Lee was in a position of great difficulty and danger when 80,000 troops could in a few hours be hurled against his divided forces.

Let us before tracing the subsequent events stop a moment longer to mark out clearly the difference in McClellan's situation before and after finding the lost order, for this was the very turning point of the campaign. Before getting the order McClellan was uncertain whether Lee's object was Washington, Baltimore, or Pennsylvania. On the one hand Halleck was cautioning him not to uncover the capital even to an attack from the south side of the Potomac, while on the other the Governor of Pennsylvania was urging that his whole army be transferred to that State to save its cities from the invader.¹ There is no reason to suppose that but for the lost order, McClellan's advance towards South Mountain would have been more rapid after Sept. 13th than before. On the contrary, it is as certain as anything of this kind

¹See Governor Curtin's despatch of Sept. 11 (*War Records*, vol. 19, Part 2, p. 268), and Lincoln's reply (p. 276).

can be that he would have continued his cautious forward movement keeping his eye, as Halleck advised, upon the south side of the Potomac lest his left flank be turned, while he watched from the other flank for Lee's advance northward which was being constantly telegraphed from Pennsylvania. In this way he would have gradually forced or followed Lee over the South Mountain. But the lost order changed all this. It relieved McClellan of all fears for Pennsylvania; it showed him that Halleck's apprehensions were groundless; it proved that his adversary was for the time wholly occupied with the capture of Harper's Ferry; it revealed the great possibilities that lay within reach of quick and vigorous blows.

Lee had been severely criticised for dividing his army at this time, and in one sense he is fairly exposed to it. But at bottom, the criticism in this case is but the common one to which a bold leader is always exposed who attempts by superior energy and skill to make up for inferiority of men and resources. General Lee's whole course during the summer of 1862 and indeed during the war, is open to this kind of criticism. There were no aggressive movements possible to an army so inferior in strength as was the Confederate that may not be condemned as rash, while on the other hand a strictly defensive war against the resources and facilities of attack possessed by the North pointed to certain and not distant collapse. Lee's expectation in regard to the reduction of Harper's Ferry was a reasonable one, and the risk he assumed in dividing his army to effect it was less than the risk he incurred in the operations against Pope three weeks before. A single day more of time would probably have rendered unnecessary the struggle at the South Mountain passes; two days would certainly have done so, and the Confederate army loaded with the spoils of Harper's Ferry would have reunited at Hagerstown without difficulty. No one can read the history of this campaign, no one can study McClellan's career, no one can see the doubt and anxiety of the Federal administration as shown by Halleck's despatches without feeling that these two days, and more, would have been Lee's had the course of events not been affected by the accident of the lost despatch. One of the most curious things about this despatch is

the crotchet of General D. H. Hill the officer to whom the lost copy was sent, that Lee was benefited instead of being injured by the loss of it. We have no time to dwell on this notion.

Let us return to the story. Lee learned on the night of the 13th that McClellan had one of his orders and that the Federal army showed unusual signs of activity. Some Southern sympathizer was present when the paper was brought to McClellan and witnessed the exultation it produced at the Federal head-quarters. This gentleman made his way through the lines as speedily as possible, found General Stuart early in the evening, and told his story. Stuart at once dispatched the news to Lee who was at Hagerstown with Longstreet and confirmed the statement by saying that the Federal army had evinced much activity during the afternoon.

D. H. Hill had been left at Boonsboro to hold Turner's Gap while McLaws had been instructed to hold Brownsville and Crampton's Gaps through which he had passed on his way to Maryland Heights. The cavalry were on the eastern side of the mountain watching the Federal approach. Longstreet's division had been taken to Hagerstown, twelve miles in the rear of the South Mountain, to get supplies and look after the Pennsylvania troops which were reported as advancing towards that point. When Lee received Stuart's dispatch, he seems at once to have determined upon the boldest of the courses open to him. Longstreet advised a withdrawal behind the Antietam, but this could only be done by abandoning the investment of Harper's Ferry and even then with risk to McLaws. Lee was not prepared to give up the prize of Harper's Ferry unless forced. The fall of that place might now occur, at any hour, it could certainly not be long delayed. Meanwhile the Confederates would have the immense advantage of the mountain barrier in stopping McClellan. A less force than Lee had at hand, skilfully used at a mountain pass had often baffled a great army. Hill had 5,000 men, which well posted at the key points ought to stop McClellan for the time, and Longstreet could more than double Hill's force by the middle of the afternoon, that is by the time McClellan could get any large force into action. The condition of the Federal army and Mc-

Clellan's cautious disposition were further incentives to the course of the Confederate commander. Hence, instead of breaking the investment of Harper's Ferry and concentrating at once on the Antietam, Lee informed Hill of the state of affairs by midnight of the 13th and directed him to see in person to the defense of the main gap, while Longstreet was ordered to return early in the morning to Hill's support. Lee also transferred his own headquarters to Boonsboro. We have not space to describe in detail the struggle at Turner's nor at Crampton's gap on Sept. 14th. McClellan had moved near enough the night before to be able to strike with great force. His main efforts were directed against Turner's gap where the old National road crosses the mountain. Here it was that D. H. Hill with five brigades and one regiment of cavalry blocked his way. The struggle was long and bloody but it was poorly managed by the Confederates. D. H. Hill had not studied the ground well and was dilatory in the disposition of his forces. Only two brigades were on the mountain top during the night of the 13th. The others lay around Boonsboro at the western base of the ridge. Nor were these brought up and placed in position promptly on the 14th. The consequence was that General Cox secured a foot-hold on the top of the mountain beyond Hill's right before he knew it, and while the Confederates were moving in that direction. In the ensuing struggle the Confederate General Garland and many of his men fell. The supports which Hill now brought up, too tardy to save Garland from defeat, were badly handled, and accomplished little. General Hill says one brigade never drew trigger. On the north side of the gap Rhodes made a gallant and brilliant fight against Hooker in the afternoon but was unsupported and gradually forced back. Had Hill posted two of his brigades at Fox's, and the gap south of it, early in the morning, as carefully as he did Colquit across the main road, and had he sent two brigades instead of one with Rhodes to the north side, it is probable that the Federals would have been held in check on the flanks, just as they were by Colquit on the turnpike itself.

Longstreet's troops after a long and hurried march came to Hill's assistance about the middle of the afternoon, but Reno and Hooker

had then made decided progress, and it was as much as the Confederates could do to hold on to the main gap itself and prevent the Union troops from crossing the mountain. Such positions had been won by the Federals on both right and left as rendered another day's struggle impossible and before daylight General Lee withdrew his troops from the gap and directed them towards Sharpsburg. Such was the result at Turner's or the Boonsboro gap. As for Crampton's gap, Franklin reached and attacked it about mid-day, but was stubbornly held in check for some time by Munford with a small force of infantry and dismounted cavalry. These were poorly supported, however, and were finally run over. By nightfall Franklin, making better progress than the main body, had reached the western base of the mountain directly in the rear of McLaws.

Thus on the night of the 14th success seem to smile on McClellan's plans. He had lost time it is true, in pushing his attacks. After the discovery of Lee's plans he should not have delayed an hour in seizing the passes. Instead of this he had rested during the night of the 13th, and had made his attack on the 14th, with deliberation. Greater promptness might have saved Harper's Ferry—it certainly would have added much to the embarrassment of his adversary. But as it was, McClellan's attacks had been successful, and he had inflicted severe losses upon Hill and Longstreet.

Lee had held the passes for a day—long enough as it had proved to insure the fall of Harper's Ferry—but he had been driven from them and on the morning of the 15th he fell back to Sharpsburg, that he might the more readily cover the withdrawal of McLaws, if necessary, while securing the speediest concentration of his army either on the north or the south bank of the Potomac. He was especially anxious about McLaws whose position was critical, and whom he had ordered to join him on the Antietam if pressed by Franklin before the surrender of Harper's Ferry. The fall of this place early in the day relieved Lee of this anxiety. It opened an easy way of retreat for McLaws and it enabled the Confederate commander to call back by forced marches all the troops that had been engaged there.

Lee now determined to give battle north of the Potomac, if he could concentrate his army in time. Should McClellan press him too quickly for this he was ready to withdraw D. H. Hill and Longstreet to the south side at Shepherdstown, and Jackson's first orders looked to the covering of such a movement. But Lee was unwilling to give up Maryland without a battle. The success of Harper's Ferry had been a great one, but he was not ready to yield to McClellan without further contest the advantage that would follow a forced withdrawal into Virginia. The battle before him would be fought under disadvantageous circumstances that he had not expected, and that might well give him pause; but on the other hand, it was a battle in which McClellan would have to take the initiative, and experience had taught Lee to expect much in such a case from the overcaution of his antagonist. Besides, immense results might follow a victory, and a victory Lee believed to be within his reach notwithstanding all the difficulties of his situation.

The surrender of Harper's Ferry was known to McClellan as soon as to Lee, that is, by the middle of the forenoon of the 15th. It made no great difference in the movements of the Federal commander. He had advanced on the 14th, with two objects in view—one the relief of Harper's Ferry—the other the overthrow of part of Lee's army. He had not been prompt enough to effect the first object. Had Franklin pushed through Crampton's gap early on the 15th, and pressed vigorously upon the rear of McLaws it is possible—though by no means certain—that Harper's Ferry might have been relieved; but, as we have seen, Franklin had reached the western base of the mountain only at nightfall, and when he moved next morning it was to find McLaws drawn up across Pleasant Valley, in so strong a position that Franklin hesitated to attack. The fall of Harper's Ferry relieved McLaws from his embarrassing position and enabled him to withdraw from Franklin's front without inconvenience. It must be counted a capital mistake on Franklin's part that he permitted this withdrawal without doing anything to prevent or impede it.

But the main body of McClellan's army had been directed against D. H. Hill and Longstreet, had forced them from Turner's

gap, and on the morning of the 15th was ready to follow them up. The failure to save Harper's Ferry should have stimulated McClellan's efforts to accomplish the other part of his plan. It was within his power to push Lee entirely across the Potomac or to force him to battle while the greater part of his troops were away. McClellan knew that upon the fall of Harper's Ferry the Confederate commander would strain every nerve to concentrate his army and he knew that this concentration could be effected inside of two days. It was vitally important, therefore, to him that not an hour should be lost in forcing Lee to fight.

It is impossible not to be struck with the contrast between the energy that characterized the operations of the two armies during those two days. Lee began to retreat to the Antietam on the morning of the 15th covering his rear with cavalry and impeding the advance of the enemy as much as possible. By midday the troops were placed upon the heights of the Antietam and dispositions made to give battle. Orders had been sent to Jackson to hasten back from Harper's Ferry and the capitulation was no sooner effected than that officer prepared to join his commander. Jackson's troops were much exhausted by the marching and manœuvring of the past few days. Many of them had had no sleep on the night of the 14th, and no breakfast the next morning. Jackson himself is said to have fallen asleep on a chair during his interview with General White, while copies of the terms of the surrender were being prepared for signing. But no matter, the troops were fed; A. P. Hill was left with one division to parole the prisoners and dispose of the captured property; and having ordered Walker and McLaws to follow, Jackson was, before nightfall, leading two of his divisions towards Sharpsburg. All night the weary column tramped on, and after marching seventeen miles and wading the Potomac, reached the field in the forenoon of the 16th. Walker followed some hours later. McLaws, who was delayed by crossing into Virginia at Harper's Ferry, and who was not so good a marcher, did not reach Sharpsburg until 10 o'clock of the 17th, when the great battle had been in progress for some hours. Last of all, A. P. Hill, leaving Harper's Ferry at 6 o'clock on the 17th, reached the field by the middle of the

afternoon, in time to do his part—and a great part—in the battle. Lee effected this concentration at heavy cost in the exhaustion of the men and the consequent straggling. Jackson's divisions sank to brigades and many men from all the commands dropped along the roadside. Still, Lee brought all the divisions of his army together in time to participate in the battle. Military history furnishes but few examples of so masterful and so energetic a concentration of widely scattered forces in front of a powerful enemy. On the other hand, McClellan followed Lee to the banks of the Antietam, but instead of crossing and attacking at once, he waited the arrival of the mass of his army, and its cumbersome material. The opportunity of attacking Lee while worn by the conflict at South Mountain and out of reach of all the troops engaged at Harper's Ferry was thus lost. Next day, the 16th, McClellan spent in reconnoitering. If it was a mistake not to attack on the afternoon of the 15th, it was a greater mistake not to attack on the 16th. But McClellan was so impressed by Lee's bold front and his evident intention of giving battle that he hesitated to assault before his entire army was at hand. There was much in recent events to make McClellan cautious, there was much in the then present condition of affairs to prevent him from being rash, but it is simply impossible to explain why, after moving forward with the design of crushing the half of Lee's divided army, after having taken the first steps towards the execution of this design at the South Mountain passes, he should have given Lee the time and opportunity to confront him with a united army at Sharpsburg.

Though an indecisive one, the battle of Sharpsburg was one of the great battles of the war, and one of those best deserving of careful study. We can only outline its prominent features. Lee's army was posted on the heights west of the Antietam, and his front was covered by that stream. The Confederate centre and left were some distance in rear of the creek, the crossing of which on that part of his line Lee did not attempt to dispute. The creek was crossed by stone bridges and by several fords. Lee's left up stream was his most vulnerable point as on that flank the country was less broken and the stream easily passable. The Confederate army occupied a line of about two miles on which

Lee was able to place not over 35,000¹ men of all arms. The Confederate loss at South Mountain had been considerable and the marches to and from Harper's Ferry had caused a much greater depletion of their ranks, but if the Confederate numbers were much reduced it was the very flower of that army that remained. Only the bravest and most vigorous of the men who had fought their way from the James to the Potomac now stood north of the latter stream ready to give battle. The Federal army which lay on the eastern side of the Antietam, numbered, according to McClellan, 87,000,² and this included a large number of the veterans of the Peninsula, the Shenandoah, and the Rappahannock. General Palfrey thinks McClellan's numbers are too high and it is possible that the Federals had available for battle not over 75,000 or 80,000 men. McClellan's plan of attack was a good one. He determined to throw three of his corps or about half of his army under Hooker, Mansfield, and Sumner, against Lee's left. At the same time he directed Burnside's corps against Lee's right over the bridge since known as "Burnside's." Burnside's attack was to divert the Confederate right and was to be converted into a co-operating attack when success began to crown the Federal efforts on the other wing. The cavalry were to occupy the attention of the Confederate centre and were, if necessary, to have the support of Porter who was held in reserve near the centre of the Federal army. The disposition of his cavalry was the weakest point in McClellan's plan of battle. It might have been of far more use on either flank.

The tremendous blow which McClellan dealt with his right wing fell first upon Jackson to whom Lee had committed the Confederate left. Stuart with a part of his cavalry covered Jackson's flank. From daylight until 10 o'clock a fight unsurpassed in determination, in fierceness, in carnage, filled the famous cornfield and woods about the Dunker Church with the dead and wounded of both armies. Hooker first threw himself with his

¹See Lee's Report. Taylor's *Four Years with General Lee*, p. 70-73. Also Early's estimate in Address at Washington and Lee University, 1872.

²See McClellan's Report.

accustomed dash upon Jackson, but though he inflicted heavy loss his corps was literally shivered to pieces. Mansfield coming to his assistance, fell at the head of his troops, but Jackson and Hood and part of D. H. Hill's men were borne back gradually by the exhausting and unequal struggle. Fearful, however, was the price which these Southern soldiers exacted for the ground they yielded. When Sumner led forth the third Federal corps to the attack he testifies that the commands of Hooker and Mansfield had been practically dispersed. Besides the artillery which in strong array formed a barrier against all the waves of Confederate success, there were but a few hundred men of the two corps, which had preceded him to be found, in order, upon the battle field. The Confederates on the other hand were reduced almost to the proportions of a picket line, and when Sumner pushed forward at the head of Sedgwick's division it seemed as if neither the courage nor the skill of Jackson could longer avert the threatened destruction. But Early, at the head of the only intact brigade on Jackson's line checked the advance of the Federals and a few moments later, having been joined by McLaws who had just arrived from Harper's Ferry and Walker who had come over from the Confederate right, struck the flank of Sedgwick's division with such force and effect that in twenty minutes this splendid body of 5,000 troops was broken into fragments and 2,000 of them lay wounded or dead upon the field. This magnificent charge virtually decided the day on Lee's left flank and gave Jackson possession of the field.

Sumner's other divisions which had been directed against D. H. Hill at the Confederate center met for a time with greater success. Hill's line ran along a narrow, crooked, country road to be known in all coming time as the "Bloody Lane." Here for an hour or two brave men fought and died stubbornly refusing to yield. In that lane Rhodes' Alabamians and G. B. Anderson's North Carolinians fought most courageously. The gallant and persistent assaults of French and Richardson were for a time repelled, but finally the efforts of these two divisions, composed of excellent troops as they were, and led by such men as Barlow and Cross were successful. Rhodes and Anderson leaving the bloody lane

piled with the dead were driven from their position and the Confederate centre seemed pierced. R. H. Anderson's division had come up to the assistance of this part of the Confederate line but Anderson was wounded and his badly handled troops were driven back with loss. Richardson's advance reached the Piper House. A number of Confederate batteries under Carter, H. P. Jones and others were the most efficient agents in checking the Federal advance at this critical stage. Richardson hesitated to expose his flank by pushing on, especially after the defeat of Sedgwick. The severity of the Federal losses and the fall of the brave Richardson himself no doubt contributed to the same result. By one o'clock the battle had died down on the centre as well as on the left of the Confederate position. Both sides were exhausted and were for a time content that the slaughter should cease. Franklin's corps reached this part of the field about midday and took the place of the exhausted commands which constituted the Federal right. But when Franklin asked to be led against the Confederates, Sumner declared that the whole Federal right wing was too much shattered to admit of risking the only reserves within reach and would not permit it. Later in the day McClellan confirmed this judgment.

Meantime Burnside had been all the forenoon striving to carry the bridge by which he desired to cross his corps against the Confederate right. Here two skeleton regiments of Georgians under Toombs, with a battery or two, disputed the way. Again and again were the Federal assaults repulsed until the 400 or 500 Confederates had killed or wounded more of their assailants than their own numbers. Finally, about the time the battle ceased on the other wing, Burnside discovered a ford below, and crossing at it compelled the brave Georgians to leave their post or be captured. It was after midday when Burnside thus forced a passage. An hour or more was spent in forming the troops, and about the middle of the afternoon he pressed forward toward Sharpsburg, opposed only by some 2,500 infantry under D. R. Jones and a number of Confederate batteries. Lee had stripped his right early in the day to reinforce his left and it seemed at one time as if the slender force opposed to Burnside must be overwhelmed.

The Federal advance, in full tide of success, had even reached the outskirts of Sharpsburg, when A. P. Hill reached the field at the very crisis of the action. He had left Harper's Ferry at sunrise and going up the Virginia side of the Potomac had waded the river and now, after a march of 17 miles, was hastening to reinforce the sorely pressed line. With admirable promptness and skill Hill threw three of his brigades against the flank of Burnside's column. Again victory perched on the Confederate standards. Rodman was killed, his division thrown into confusion, and defeated, and in an hour or so Burnside's entire corps was huddled about the bridge from which they advanced, part of them even taking refuge on the eastern side. Thus at nightfall the Confederates had beaten back completely the formidable attack on their right, and Burnside had nothing to show for his day's work but the bridge over the Antietam. Pleasanton's demonstrations against the Confederate centre were too unimportant to dwell upon.

Thus ended the battle of Sharpsburg. There has been much ill-directed criticism of McClellan both as to the conception and the execution of his plan of battle. The plan was good enough, and the execution of it on Sumner's wing was at first not bad. Hooker's and Mansfield's assaults were spirited and bloody and they were made skilfully and with all the force at command. It was an open-field, stand-up-fight between these two corps and the Confederates. If the Union troops failed to drive back Jackson and the flower of the Confederate army from the field it was not their fault nor that of their leaders. Sumner's attack, too, was vigorous and determined enough, though too far separated in time from Hooker's and Mansfield's. But Sumner committed two serious errors, first, in permitting his corps to be divided, and next, in the incautious way with which he threw Sedgwick's division against such an antagonist as Jackson. It was not, however, in the mode of attack on the Federal right, that the great error of the day lay; this error consisted in the dilatory manner in which Burnside performed his part of the drama. His attack should have been made while that on the Federal right was in progress. Had Burnside's blow fallen two or three hours earlier than it did, A. P. Hill, the Desaix of Sharpsburg, would have been out of the

question, for he was then on the south side of the Potomac. Had Burnside pressed forward while Sumner was still fighting it is possible that neither the skill of Lee nor the fighting of Longstreet and Jackson might have been able to keep the Confederate lines intact. We make no attempt to apportion the blame for this delay between McClellan and Burnside, but wherever the fault lies, this mistake more than all else, cost the Federals the day.

McClellan and Sumner have been criticised for not permitting Franklin to attack, but as Sumner said at the time, there was no reason to think that 10,000 or 12,000 men could accomplish what 40,000 had failed to do after putting forth all their strength. Nor is there now any reason to think that Franklin would have done more than add to the list of casualties on that bloody day. At the very time when McClellan was deciding against this movement, Jackson by Lee's direction was attempting to organize a column of assault from his sorely thinned ranks with which to drive the Federals across the Antietam. Stuart was to open the way for the advance of this column. A vigorous outburst of Federal artillery at the first aggressive movement convinced the Confederate leaders that they were too weak for this enterprise and they desisted; but there is no reason to believe that Jackson would not have welcomed and repulsed any attack that Franklin could have made upon his lines about the Dunker church.

Nor has McClellan been justly condemned for failing to renew the battle on the 18th. Fearfully thinned and exhausted as were the Confederates, Lee was in the better fighting condition on the 18th, than was McClellan. In Hooker's corps for instance only some 6700 men were with their colors on the 18th, while there were 6300 stragglers and fugitives over and above the killed and wounded the day before. Mansfield's corps and Sedgwick's division were likewise terribly shattered. On the other wing Burnside asked and obtained Morell's division as reinforcements to enable him to hold on to the bridge over the Antietam. The Confederates were in no such condition as this; they had maintained their ground; Lee felt after the battle entirely able to resist any further assaults that McClellan might make with the troops he then had, and therefore waited in position a renewal of the fight

on the 18th. McClellan, supported by the judgment of his best officers, decided to defer the attacking until the heavy reinforcements on their way should arrive, and there seems absolutely nothing on which to base an opinion that he could, with his shattered forces, have driven Lee on the 18th from the position which the Confederates had been able to hold all day on the 17th against the most determined assaults of the Federal army. But Lee lost heavily in men, there were far less than 30,000 Confederates in line on the 18th, he knew that large reserves were hastening to McClellan's assistance, (Couch and Humphreys brought up 14,000 of them during the 18th); the Confederates were too weak to risk another battle with fresh troops in front and the Potomac in their rear. Lee therefore withdrew across the river on the night of the 18th, and on the 20th, checked in a bloody and decided way the attempt to follow him.

Thus ended the campaign. A long period of rest and recuperation succeeded before the two armies were again to lock horns at Fredericksburg. A review of the campaign shows that (in the then circumstances of the two belligerents) the balance of advantage remained with the Federals. Lee had occupied Maryland too short a time to secure any reinforcements. He had captured 12,500 men with a large quantity of arms and artillery at Harper's Ferry, he had killed and wounded 15,000¹ men of McClellan's army, but this had cost him 10,000 men besides some artillery. He had left the Federal army in such a condition that for six weeks it was not ready to resume the offensive, but his own forces had been so greatly depleted not merely by the casualties of battle, but by the labors and privations of the campaign, that an equal length of time was required to restore them to first rate order. McClellan, if he failed to seize all that fortune had placed in his hands in the revelation of Lee's designs, had nevertheless effected a great deal. On the second of September he had assumed command of the disjointed and dispirited forces about Washington with instructions to prevent the capture of the capital. In two weeks he had restored confidence to the army, to the government,

¹ *War Records*, Vol. 19, Part 1, p. 204.

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to the country. He had rendered Washington and Baltimore secure, or rather had made their safety manifest, for they were not in danger. He had forced the Confederate army from Maryland and inflicted upon it losses which, if far less in amount than those he had himself sustained, were far more difficult to repair. He might have done more, but it is nevertheless true that with the exception of the fortnight that ended at Appomattox, no commander of the army of the Potomac ever did so much in two weeks as did McClellan in the Sharpsburg campaign.

We have before noticed the criticism directed against Lee for dividing his army in order to invest Harper's Ferry, and we believe he was fully justified in taking that risk. There is another point where, as it seems to us, he is far more open to criticism. Should he have fought at Sharpsburg at all? Would it not have been wiser, after having effected the fall of Harper's Ferry, to have retired into Virginia without a battle? On the night of the 15th two-thirds of his army was on the south side of the Potomac; the remainder could have been transferred without difficulty. In the light of subsequent events we believe this course would have been the wiser. The Confederate army, concentrated on the south side of the Potomac, would have been better able to receive McClellan's assault if he had ventured to make one; or failing this, Lee might have recrossed at Williamsport or above if he desired to attack McClellan. Lee did not realize fully the depletion that was thinning his ranks; and he probably expected to have McLaws and R. H. Anderson's divisions on the field by the night of the 16th instead of the forenoon of the 17th. Fewer stragglers and the earlier arrival of McLaws might have given Lee better results. But it seems probable on the whole that Lee overrated his own strength and underrated the improvement that had taken place in the Federal army since he had driven it two weeks before into the lines of Washington. If McClellan erred in not fighting on the 15th and 16th, Lee erred in fighting at all.

But however doubtful the policy of accepting battle at Sharpsburg, when the battle had been once joined, the tactics of the Confederate commander were such as to reflect the highest credit upon his skill. Lee had no reserves and could afford none, but he

handled his forces with a judgment so cool and clear as to leave nothing for criticism. It would be difficult for us now, with all the facts before us, to correct his dispositions. Again and again the utmost tension existed at different parts of the Confederate line and it was hard to know where to look for succor. But the succor was obtained, even when other points had to be stripped; it was always in time, and it was used effectively.

If it be the part of a commander in the field to possess a full comprehension of the situation; a just knowledge not only of his own resources but of those of his enemy; a fair estimate of the character of the attacks that can be made upon him, and an accurate judgment as to how and where these blows will be delivered; and if to knowledge of this sort there should be added the capacity to handle his own army masterfully; we believe that on no other occasion did General Lee show more ability for the direction of a great battle than at Sharpsburg.

TWO LETTERS OF LAFAYETTE.

FROM THE ORIGINALS IN THE COLLECTIONS OF THE
MARYLAND HISTORICAL SOCIETY.

[Address wanting]

19th November [1811]

My dear Sir

I am too anxious to hear of your negotiation to have remained long absent from town. On my arrival last night I was told of your presentation, and will call before dinner to know something more. In the meanwhile I happened last evening to meet a Counsellor of State, M. Malouet, with whom I spoke of our affairs as I do with every one whom I think to be of some instant or remote use. He told me he was now making a Memorial about the general Business which is to go through the Minister of the Interior to the Emperor, and agreed to introduce the arguments I had

given him, promising that if I gave them in writing to-morrow before noon they would certainly be put under the Emperor's eyes. He advised to insist upon your means to prevent a mixture of English commodities, declaring it to be the principal difficulty to be removed from the Imperial mind. M. Malouet is a very sensible honest man, known to be so by the Emperor, and whose opinions cannot be suspected of any selfish motive. He has resided sixteen or seventeen years in England, had a great share, as an Emigrant in the confidence of that Government, and altho' neither you nor I would have liked any dealings with them, he behaved, in the line of his party, with moderation and good sense. I give you these particulars to show that ideas presented by him may do some good. It is a great deal to be assured by a man of veracity they shall be conveyed to the Emperor from the Interior Department as well as that of Foreign Affairs.

I have mentioned to you a kind of friendly negociation I entered upon at the desire of Gl. Armstrong with the Prince Royal of Sweden. Inclosed is the copy of my letter of introduction for Mr. Speyer. I thought it most proper to send it to Gl. Armstrong, under whose direction I had acted than to the President himself so that I have got no answer respecting that business. I am afraid our friends in Washington have not fully attended to the good disposition of Bernadotte and his situation in the North. An Envoy has been sent to the Danish King, a man much more dependent on the will of others. It must be acknowledged that of the two sets of kings, the new one is the better, altho' we might well have dispensed with both; but these have more sense and a better Education, or they could not have been thought of to come in. And among them Bernadotte is, in my opinion the Best. Perhaps will you think it proper in your despatches to say a word of that business.

Mr. Louis came last night to Mde. de Tillé's to know how he could forward a letter from M.—— mentioning he had seen three times Mr. Poster and was endeavoring to bring about my loan.

My respects to the ladies.

Most affectionally yours

LAFAYETTE.

La Grange, June 23^d 1824

My dear Sir

I am much obliged to you for those Highly valued favors and other kind Testimonies of a friendly Remembrance. Mr. Townsend Sharples did me the pleasure of a Visit with Mr. Jones of West Chester. His time was short; they left us the next morning, so has done Mr. Cook who arrived last evening, but he has promised to return Monday. To those good and welcome friends I refer myself for intelligence respecting the family at La Grange, who cordially shared in my Gratification to receive them under this American roof.

I thank you, my dear Sir, for your kind attempts to obtain wild turkies male and female. Two males I have but no hens. The mamoth Turkey died, you know on the passage over. Also my acknowledgments to Mr. Thomas McGrath of Yorktown. Be pleased also to accept my thanks In your Endeavours to procure American Rabbits, partridges, pheasants, all animals that are of a different kind from their European namesakes. I like to be surrounded in these retirements with productions of the Country so very dear to my heart, and find an additional Justification in the sense of my obligations to you.

With affectionate Regard and good wishes, I am

your sincere friend

LAFAYETTE

Jon. Townsend, Esq., Baltimore.
(Indorsed) Rec. 8 mo. 21st 1827.

BENEDICT LEONARD CALVERT THE YOUNGER.

Of this gentleman, brother of Charles, fifth Lord Baltimore, and Governor of Maryland 1727-31, not very much is known. He seems to have been one of the most promising scions of the Calvert family, and might have attained distinction in England (where he sat in Parliamont as member for Harwich in 1726) but for his early death. He was born in 1700, and died at sea on the voyage from Maryland in 1731.

A number of brief but interesting references to him are preserved in the Diaries of the antiquary, Thomas Hearne, published by the Oxford Historical Society. As this book is rare on this side of the Atlantic, we have thought some of Hearne's notes worth reproducing.

Hearne made the acquaintance of young Calvert in 1717, when the latter was a Gentleman Commoner of Christ's College, Oxford, in which University Hearne was resident, having been elected Architypographus, or Superintendent of printing and publishing. Unfortunately he was an uncompromising Jacobite and non-juror, and the University was a nest of Hanoverians, so he found himself in perpetual hot water. Taking advantage of some imprudent remarks of his in prefaces to two works edited by him for the University press, they excluded him from the printing office, and tried to expel him from the University.

It was when in the midst of these worries that Hearne became acquainted with young Calvert, and seems to have been attracted to him at once, speaking of him as "a young gentleman of very great hopes, and studious of antiquities." "He is now seventeen years of age. He was educated for about a year at St. Omer's. He was then a Papist. His father was first a Papist, and some time before he died became a Protestant. This young Calvert was converted at Westminster school by Dr. Bisse, Bishop of Hereford, and Dr. Friend, the Master of the said school. His father

died in the thirty-seventh year of his age. His mother is now a Papist, being a convert of the Romish Church, by the persuasion of his father."

A young man of good family, virtuous life, with a proper respect for his elders, and who, above all, had a taste for antiquities and sound scholarship, held a master-key to Hearne's heart. Their acquaintance quickly ripened to friendship, and the old scholar found in his young friend's society a great solace when his soul was vexed with Whiggery and bad Latin. They took walks together, and young Calvert told him bits of family history.

"Mr Calvert (with whom I walked to Heddington to-day) tells me that my Lady Litchfield hath a good collection of original pictures, particularly of the Court of King Charles II, whose daughter she is by the Duchess of Cleveland, and hath been a very great beauty. She is a very good and virtuous lady. The King had a greater value and love for this lady than he had for his other children. Mr. Calvert (from whom I have this story) is grandson to the said lady who married Sir Edward Henry Lee, who thereupon was created Earl of Lichfield, and after the Revolution was a non-juror, and (to his honour be it said) died so in the year 1716, aged fifty-three The foresaid Duchess of Cleveland was a very cruel and austere mother, one instance of which I learn from Mr. Calvert, who tells me that his grandmother, the Lady Lichfield, being in her mother's coach in the Park, happened to break the glass of the coach, and thereupon her father, the King, passing by in another coach, happened to stop, and asking his daughter what made her cry (for she cried as soon as the glass was broke) she answered, because she was afraid that her mother would beat her soundly. Upon this the King took her into his own coach, and showed a particular dislike of the Duchess's ill usage by sending an express message to her never to strike her more, under pain of losing his sight and favour for the future if she should offer at any such thing."

Again in February :

"Mr. Calvert hath a small Horace which belonged to his father who was an excellent and an elegant poet, in which are many Ms. Remarks done by his father, a great admirer of Horace, of which he had about thirty-five different editions."

In June Hearne puts off a journey he had intended making, to go with young Calvert to Ditchley, the seat of the Earl of Lichfield, Calvert's uncle. He remarks: "The desire I had to see the place, and the respect I have (most deservedly) for this most hopeful young gentleman, made me alter my design and defer my other journey." With this visit Hearne was greatly delighted, and he gives a full account of the noble house, and of the pictures and other rare and interesting objects there, though to his disappointment he failed to see a cabinet of ancient coins and medals, the key not being procurable. However he peeped through the key-hole of a closet, and saw a book which seemed to be an old chronicle.

Hearne's troubles were at their acutest in June, and he greatly missed the sympathetic society of young Calvert, who had gone to France. He received, however, an affectionate letter from him, wherein the youth dwells on his grief at their separation, for which, however, he had found some balm in a diligent study of antiquities. Hearne remarks:

"I preserve the letter out of the great respect I have for him, upon account of his quality, his virtues, and his skill and diligence in antiquities. It is an addition to my troubles to lose the conversation of so accomplished a person."

On Aug. 16, 1718, he records:

"This night returned to Oxford very safe (for which I bless God) my dear, excellent friend, the Honourable Benedict Leonard Calvert, Esq. He hath been with his brother, the Lord Baltimore, at Calais, Dieppe, and other places. He hath made many pertinent remarks in his journey. He expected to find many English antiquities in Calais, but was deceived. Neither could he learn whereabouts it was that the Mint for the English was in the town. It is certain that the Mint here was very famous."

Hearne displaying great interest in the genealogy of the Calvert family, young Calvert drew up the pedigree with his own hand, which is inserted in the Diary. He also furnished other parti-

culars ; for one thing, expressing a doubt of the Flemish origin of the family, which Norroy King of Arms, on the authority of Verstegan, had inserted in the exemplification issued to Sir George Calvert in 1622 (now in the possession of the Maryland Historical Society) and declaring his belief that the family was descended from the Lancashire Calverts or Calverleys.

Under the date of Feb. 12, 1718/9 we find this entry :

"Mr. Calvert tells me that his grandfather, Charles, Lord Baltimore, being well apprised of Oates's villainous design against the lives of the Roman Catholic Lords, retired, by advice of King Charles, into Maryland, and that afterwards, for his own private satisfaction, he drew up some memories about that whole [affair] which Mr. Calvert supposes to be now in the hands of his grandfather's widow."

There is some probability in this. The "Popish Plot" convulsed England in 1678-80, and in the latter year Charles visited Maryland, where he remained until 1683, being much occupied in trying to frustrate the wiles of the labyrinthine Penn.

The particulars here given are all from the sixth volume of Hearne's Diaries. As the seventh has not yet appeared, we cannot follow further the progress of this interesting friendship.

ONE OF CELERON'S PLATES.

In 1749 the Marquis de la Galissonnière, "Captain General of New France," in pursuance of his plan of claiming for the French crown the territory drained by the Mississippi and its affluents, despatched an officer, Celeron de Bienville, with orders to deposit at certain points leaden plates inscribed with that claim. A description of one of these plates, in the cabinet of the American Antiquarian Society, is given in the transactions of that society, Vol. II. This plate was buried on Aug. 16, at the mouth of the

river "Yenague," or Muskingum. It is, unhappily, in a sorely mutilated condition, not more than one-fourth of the inscription being left. In the proceedings of that Society for 1905, this fragment of a plate is said to be the only one now known to be in existence.

The Maryland Historical Society has in its collections a facsimile of another of these most interesting historical relics, which was buried two days later at the mouth of the Kanawha, and which was (and presumably still is) in perfect condition. The facsimile was sent in 1847 to the President of the Society, and we reproduce it with the accompanying letter :

My Dear Sir :

I take pleasure in sending you an accurate transcript of an engraved leaden plate which was recently found at the confluence of the Ohio and Great Kanawha Rivers, where it had lain some ninety-seven years, until from abrasion it was disclosed, projecting from the bank of the Ohio, at a depth of some six feet.

The plate, which is now in the possession of Col. Beale at Point Pleasant (mouth of the Kanawha) is about an eighth of an inch thick. In other respects the sheet which I send you is an accurate representation—one corner of it presenting jagged appearance, as if worn by the friction of the water. The inscription, as well as the several emblems of France, the fleur de lis, so much resembles the original, that the whole may be regarded as an impression from the plate.

This unpronounceable name of our river, has no place in legend or tradition—but is long since, superceded by the more euphonious Kanawha—"river of the woods."

Accept assurances of the regard and esteem of

Most truly

Yours, &c.,

JAMES M. LAIDLEY.

BRANTZ MAYER, ESQR.,
Charleston, January 25, 1847.



L'AN 1749 DV REGNE DE LOVIS XV ROY DE
FRANCE NOVS CELERON COMMANDANT DVN DE
TACHEMENT ENVOIE PAR MONSIEVR LE M^{rs} DE LA
GALISSONIERE COMMANDANT GENERAL DE LA
NOVVELLE FRANCE POVR RETABLIR LA TRANQVILLITÉ
DANS QVELQVES VILLAGES SAVVAGES DE CES CANTONS
AVONS ENTERREÉ CETTE PLAQUE A L'ENTRÉE DE LA
RIVIERE CHINODAHICHITHA LE 18 AOUST
PRES DE LA RIVIERE ÔYO AVTREMENT BELLE
RIVIERE POVR MONVMENT DV RENOVVELLEMENT DE
POSSESSION QUE NOVS AVONS PRIS DE LA DITTE
RIVIERE ÔYO ET DE TOVTES CELLES QUI Y TOMBENT
ET DE TOVTES LES TERRES DES DEVX COTES JVSQUE
AVX SOVRCES DES DITTES RIVIERES AINSI QVEN ONT
JOYV OV DV JOVIR LES PRECEDENTS ROYS DE FRANCE
ET QVILS SISONT MAINTENVS PAR LES ARMES ET
PAR LES TRAITÉS SPECIALEMENT PAR CEVX DE
RISVICK DVTRECHT ET DAIX LA CHAPELLE

The editor has endeavored, but without success, to find out where this plate now is, if still in existence. Miss Delia A. McCulloch, of Point Pleasant, W. Va., informs him that there is a report that it was taken to Richmond, copied by the Virginia Historical Society, and returned to the finder, Mr. Charles W. Beale. Mr. Beale is still living, and his statement is that he lent the plate to Mr. J. M. H. Beale, then a member of Congress, who gave it to the Smithsonian Institution; but there is no record at that Institution of its ever having been received. Miss McCulloch also states that a description and copy were given in "The Olden Time," a periodical published in Pittsburg in 1846.

As this seems to be the only perfect plate known to be in existence, a knowledge of its present whereabouts is very desirable; and the editor would be grateful for any information on this point.

TILGHMAN FAMILY.

(Continued from page 184.)

9. DR. RICHARD TILGHMAN⁷ (*Oswald*,⁶ *William*⁵) was born 3rd September, 1626, and came to Maryland with his family, in 1661, in the ship *Elizabeth and Mary*. It is not unlikely that he was induced to do so by Samuel Tilghman, probably the son of Whetenhall Tilghman, and therefore the cousin german of Richard, who had long commanded a vessel trading to Maryland and was commissioned, 15 July, 1658, "admiral" of the Maryland fleet (*Calvert Papers*, No. 205). At all events patents were issued, 17 January, 1659, in identical terms to Samuel Tilghman of London, mariner, and to Richard Tilghman, citizen and chirurgion, of London, each of whom had undertaken to transport into the province twenty persons of British descent (Md. Land Office, Lib. 4, fol. 416.420). Each patent was for 1000 acres of land on Tredavon Creek. 28 July, 1663, "Richard Tilghman of the Province of Maryland and Continent of Virginia, Doctor in Physick," purchased from James Coursey of Lincoln's Inn, in the County of Middlesex, Gent., a tract of 400 acres near the mouth of Chester River (*ibid.*, Lib. 10, fol. 447), and other records show that Dr. Tilghman, partly by grant and partly by purchase, acquired a very considerable landed estate. He was commissioned, 1 May 1669, High Sheriff of Talbot County and served until 17 June 1671 (Lib. C. D., fol. 404.438). During his residence in Maryland he was actively engaged in the practice of his profession (*Old Kent*, p. 229). He died 7 Jan. 1675/6 and is buried at The Hermitage, Queen Anne County, where his tomb is still to be seen, though the inscription is now illegible. His will, dated 5 Oct. 1673 and proved 6 March 1675/6, leaves to his son William, Tilghman's Hermitage (now known as The Hermitage) and Tilghman's Addition to the Forlorn, on Chester River; to his son Richard, Tilghman's Farm, Tilghman's Choice and Tilghman's Discovery; and to his daughter Rebecca, Poplar Hill. His wife Mary is appointed executrix. The inventory of his personal estate, filed 28 August 1676, showed a total of 187,289 pounds of tobacco. Dr. Tilghman married, in

England, Mary Foxley, who survived him and died between 1699 and 1702. In August 1683, in behalf of her son William Tilghman, then deceased, she acknowledged a deed executed by the said William 17 Oct. 1682 (Talbot Co., Lib. 4, fol. 213). 18 Jan. 1688, Mary Tilghman of Talbot Co. widow, conveys to her "son and daughter" Simon Wilmer and Rebecca his wife, 1000 acres part of Tilghman and Foxley Grove (Kent Co., Lib. M., fol. 1), and in a deed to her son Richard Tilghman, dated 20 Sept. 1699, she mentions her "well beloved daughter Rebecca Wilmer," and her "son-in-law Mr. John Lillingston and his present wife" (Talbot Co., Lib. 7, fol. 219.271). 29 August 1702, her son, Richard Tilghman, confirms the deed of his mother "Mary Tilghman, late of Talbot County, widow, deceased" to his sister Rebecca Wilmer, widow, and her children Simon and Rebecca Wilmer, for 1000 acres part of Tilghman and Foxley Grove (Kent Co., Lib. N., fol. 71).

Dr. Richard Tilghman and Mary (Foxley) his wife had issue:—

- i. SAMUEL TILGHMAN,⁸ b. 11 Dec. 1650; d. young.
 - ii. MARY TILGHMAN, b. Feb. 1655; mar. Matthew Ward (d. 1677) of Talbot Co. Her only son, Maj.-Gen. Matthew Tilghman Ward (b. 1677; d. 25 May 1741), was Speaker of the Md. Assembly, 1716-18; Chief Justice of the Provincial Court, 1729-32; Member of Council, 1719-41, and at the time of his death its President. He was commissioned, 22 Jan. 1739, Major-General, Commanding the militia of the Eastern Shore. He was twice married, but left no issue.
 - iii. WILLIAM TILGHMAN, b. 16 Feb. 1658; d. unmarried 1682.
 - iv. REBECCA TILGHMAN, d. 1725; mar., about 1681, Simon Wilmer (d. 1699) of Kent Co.
 - v. DEBORAH TILGHMAN, b. 12 March 1666.
 - vi. RICHARD TILGHMAN, b. 23 Feb. 1672; d. 23 Feb. 1738.
10. COL. RICHARD TILGHMAN⁸ (*Richard*,⁷ *Oswald*,⁶ *William*⁵) was born at The Hermitage, then called Tilghman's Hermitage, 23 Feb. 1672, and died there 23 Feb. 1738. His will, dated 25 April 1737 and proved 14 March 1738, after disposing of more than 10,000 acres in portions to his younger children leaves "the rest of my lands" to his eldest son Richard. Col. Tilghman represented Talbot County in the Maryland Assembly from 1698 to 1702 (House Journals), and was a Member of Council from 1711 until his death (U. H. Journals). In 1722, he was Chancellor of the Province (*Calvert Papers*, No. 275). He married, 7 January 1700, Anna Maria (b. 1676; d. Dec. 1748), daughter of Col.

Philemon Lloyd of Talbot County and Henrietta Maria, his wife, daughter of Capt. James Neale and widow of Richard Bennett, Jr (See *Mag.* pp. 73-75). Col. Richard Tilghman and Anna Maria his wife, are buried at The Hermitage, which is now possessed by their descendant, Miss Susan Williams. They had issue :—

- i. MARY TILGHMAN,⁹ b. 23 Aug. 1702; d. 10 Jan. 1736; mar., 12 Oct. 1721, James Earle.
- ii. PHILEMON TILGHMAN, b. 1704; d. young.
11. iii. RICHARD TILGHMAN, b. 28 April 1705; d. 9 Sept. 1766.
- iv. HENRIETTA MARIA TILGHMAN, b. 18 Aug. 1707; d. 7 Nov. 1771; mar. 1^o, 22 April 1731, George Robins, 2^o, 1747, William Goldsborough.
- v. ANNA MARIA TILGHMAN, b. 15 Nov. 1709; d. 30 Aug. 1763; mar. 1^o William Hemsley, 2^o Col. Robert Lloyd.
12. vi. WILLIAM TILGHMAN, b. 22 Sept. 1711; d. 1782.
13. vii. EDWARD TILGHMAN, b. 3 July 1713; d. 9 Oct. 1786.
14. viii. JAMES TILGHMAN, b. 6 Dec. 1716; d. 24 Aug. 1793.
15. ix. MATTHEW TILGHMAN, b. 17 Feb. 1718; d. 4 May 1790.

11. COL. RICHARD TILGHMAN⁹ (*Richard*,⁸ *Richard*,⁷ *Oswald*,⁶ *William*⁵) of the Hermitage, Queen Anne Co., was born 28 April 1705, and died 9 Sept. 1766. He was a Justice of the Provincial Court of Maryland 1746 to 1766, and was of the Quorum of that body from 1754 (Commission Book). He married Susanna (b. 19 June 1718) daughter of Peregrine Frisby (d. 1738) of Cecil County and Elizabeth his wife, daughter of Maj. Nicholas Sewall of St. Mary's County. Mrs. Elizabeth Frisby mentions her daughter Susanna Tilghman in her will (dated 15 April 1751, proved 22 April 1752).

Col. Richard Tilghman and Susanna (Frisby) his wife had issue :—

16. i. RICHARD TILGHMAN,¹⁰ b. 11 May 1739.
17. ii. PEREGRINE TILGHMAN, b. 24 Jan. 1741; d. 1807.
18. iii. JAMES TILGHMAN, b. 2 Aug. 1743; d. 19 April 1809.
19. iv. WILLIAM TILGHMAN, b. 11 March 1745; d. Dec. 1800.
- v. EDWARD TILGHMAN.
20. vi. ELIZABETH TILGHMAN, b. 24 April 1749; d. 1836; mar. William Cooke.
- vii. SUSANNA TILGHMAN, b. 1751.
- viii. ANNA MARIA TILGHMAN, b. 1759; d. 1834; mar. Henry Ward Pearce of Cecil Co.

12. WILLIAM TILGHMAN⁹ (*Richard*,⁸ *Richard*,⁷ *Oswald*,⁶ *William*⁵) of Grosses, Talbot County, was born 22 Sept. 1711, and died in 1782. His will dated 20 Dec. 1761 (with codicil 15 Nov. 1769), was proved in Talbot County 31 Oct. 1782. He was one of the Justices of Queen Anne County

1734-36, 1737-39, 1743-45, 1747-51, and 1754-60; was of the Quorum from 1737; and was Presiding Justice from 1755 to 1760 (Commission Book). He represented Queen Anne County in the Assembly from 1734 to 1738 (House Journals). He married, 2 Aug. 1736, his cousin Margaret Lloyd (b. 16 Feb. 1714) daughter of his uncle James Lloyd (b. 7 March 1680; d. 27 Sept. 1723) and Ann Grundy (b. 25 April 1690) his wife. James Lloyd was one of the representatives for Talbot County in the Maryland Assembly 1712-14 and 1716-22 (House Journals) and was a member of Council from 4 Nov. 1722 to 27 Sept. 1723 (U. H. Journals).

William Tilghman and Margaret (Lloyd) his wife had issue:—

- i. ANNA MARIA TILGHMAN,¹⁰ b. 3 Nov. 1737; d. 4 Feb. 1768; mar., 3 Sept. 1764, Charles Goldsborough (b. 2 April 1740; d. 25 Feb. 1769). Their son, Hon. Charles Goldsborough, was Governor of Maryland in 1818.
21. ii. RICHARD TILGHMAN, b. 6 April 1740; d. 12 April 1809.
- iii. JAMES TILGHMAN, b. 10 April 1742.
- iv. MARGARET TILGHMAN, b. 24 Dec. 1744; mar. her cousin Richard Tilghman (son of Matthew).
- v. HENRIETTA MARIA TILGHMAN, b. 18 Oct. 1749.
- vi. MARY TILGHMAN, b. 28 June 1753; mar. Edward Roberts of Talbot Co.

13. EDWARD TILGHMAN⁹ (*Richard*,⁸ *Richard*,⁷ *Oswald*,⁶ *William*⁵) of Wye, Queen Anne County, was born 3 July 1713, and died 9 Oct. 1786. He was High Sheriff of Queen Anne County from 5 Nov. 1739 to 5 Nov. 1742, and was one of the Justices of the County from 1743 to 1749 (Commission Book). He represented the County in the Assembly from 1746 to 1750, when he was commissioned Keeper of the Rolls for the Eastern Shore (House Journals). In 1754 he was again elected to the Assembly and served until 1771, being Speaker of the House during the sessions of 1770 and 1771 (*ibid.*). In the House Journals he is styled Captain in 1746, and Colonel in 1756, indicating that he held these ranks in the militia of his County. In 1765 he was a member of the Stamp Act Congress and one of the Committee which drew up the remonstrance to Parliament. His will was proved 31 Oct. 1786. Col. Tilghman was thrice married. His first wife was Anna Maria Turbutt, daughter of Maj. William Turbutt of Queen Anne County. His second wife, whom he married in 1749, was Elizabeth (b. 25 Nov.

1720), daughter of Samuel Chew of Dover and Mary (Galloway) his wife. The third wife of Col. Tilghman, married 25 May 1759, was Juliana (b. 3 Jan. 1729) daughter of Dominick Carroll of Cecil County and Mary his wife, daughter of Maj. Nicholas Sewall of St. Mary's County.

Col. Edward Tilghman and Anna Maria (Turbutt) his first wife had issue :—

i. ANNA MARIA TILGHMAN,¹⁰ mar. Bennet Chew.

By his second wife, Elizabeth Chew, Col. Tilghman had issue :—

22. i. RICHARD TILGHMAN.
- ii. EDWARD TILGHMAN, b. 11 Feb. 1750/1 ; d. 1 Nov. 1815.
- iii. BENJAMIN TILGHMAN.
- iv. ELIZABETH TILGHMAN, mar. her cousin Richard Tilghman (son of Richard) of The Hermitage.
- v. ANNA MARIA TILGHMAN, mar. 1^o Charles Goldsborough (b. 1744 ; d. 1774), 2^o Rt. Rev. Robert Smith, Bishop of South Carolina.

Col. Edward Tilghman and his third wife, Juliana Carroll, had issue :—

23. i. MATTHEW TILGHMAN,
- ii. BENJAMIN TILGHMAN, b. Dec. 1764.
- iii. MARY TILGHMAN, mar. her cousin Richard Tilghman, (son of Matthew).
- iv. SUSANNA TILGHMAN, mar. Richard Ireland Jones.

(To be Continued.)

THE BROOKE FAMILY.

(Continued from page 188.)

15. RICHARD BROOKE⁶ (*Baker*,⁵ *Baker*,⁴ *Robert*,³ *Thomas*,² *Richard*¹) of St. Mary's Co., died in 1719. His will, dated 5 Dec. 1718 and proved 3 Aug. 1719, mentions his sons Richard and Baker, to whom he leaves "all my land being part of Delabrook Manor"; his uncle Leonard Brooke, deceased; and "my beloved wife." Testator's brother, Leonard Brooke, is appointed executor. Richard Brooke married Clare daughter of Maj. William Boarman of Charles Co. She married, secondly, Richard Sherburne of St. Mary's Co., and had by him a son Nicholas Sherburne. Her will, dated 21 Feb'y

1745 and proved 6 Aug. 1747, mentions her three sons Richard and Baker Brooke, and Nicholas Sherburne.

Richard Brooke and Clare (Boarman) his wife had issue:—

- i. RICHARD BROOKE,¹ d. 1755; mar. Monica, dau. of Clement Gardiner of St. Mary's Co., and had two daughters 1, Clare Brooke,² 2, Anna Brooke,³ mar. . . . Hill. Mrs. Monica Brooke, who d. 1772, mar. secondly Henry Queen (b. 1729; d. 1768).
- ii. BAKER BROOKE, d. 1756; mar. Mary, dau. of Wm. Simpson of Charles Co., but had no issue.

16. LEONARD BROOKE⁶ (*Baker,⁵ Baker,⁴ Robert,³ Thomas,² Richard¹*) of Prince George's Co. died in 1736. His will, dated June 1735 and proved 4 May 1736, mentions his wife Ann and the children given below. Mrs. Ann Brooke survived her husband and died in 1779. Her will, dated 15 Dec. 1769, was proved in Prince George's Co. 2 July 1779.

Leonard Brooke and Ann his wife had issue:—

- i. BAKER BROOKE.¹
- ii. OSWALD BROOKE.
25. iii. LEONARD BROOKE, b. 1728; d. 1785.
26. iv. RICHARD BROOKE, d. 1771.
- v. ANNA BROOKE.
- vi. KATHRINE BROOKE.
- vii. JANE BROOKE.
- viii. MARY BROOKE.
- ix. HENRIETTA BROOKE.

17. THOMAS BROOKE⁶ (*Thomas,⁵ Thomas,⁴ Robert,³ Thomas,² Richard¹*) of Prince George's Co. was born in 1683, and died 28 Dec. 1744. His age is given in depositions as 47 in 1731, and 53 in 1736 (Pr. Geo. Co. Records). His will, dated 27 Dec. 1738 and proved 29 March 1745, mentions only his wife Lucy and his son Walter Brooke; the names of his other children are obtained from a family record. Thomas Brooke was representative for Prince George's Co. in the Maryland Assembly in 1713 (House Journal), and was High Sheriff of the County from 28 Aug. 1731 to 28 Aug. 1734 (Commission Book). He married, 9 May 1705, Lucy eldest daughter of Col. Walter Smith of Calvert Co. She was born in 1688, and died 15 April 1770. Her will, dated 25 Nov. 1769, was proved 30 Nov. 1770.

Thomas Brooke and Lucy (Smith) his wife had issue:—

27. i. THOMAS BROOKE,¹ b. 30 April 1706; d. 1749.
28. ii. WALTER BROOKE, b. 29 Dec. 1707; d. 9 March 1740/1.
- iii. MARY BROOKE, b. 8 Oct. 1709; mar. Peter Dent (b. 1694; d. 1757) of Pr. George's Co.

- iv. ANNA BROOKE, b. 16 June 1711; mar. . . . Harris.
 - v. NATHANIEL BROOKE, b. 1 March 1712.
 - vi. LUCY BROOKE, b. 10 Oct. 1714; d. 12 May 1718.
 - 29. vii. RICHARD BROOKE, b. 2 June 1716; d. 13 July 1783.
 - viii. ELEANOR BROOKE, b. 7 March 1718; mar. Col. Samuel Beall (d. 1778) of Frederick Co.
 - ix. RACHEL BROOKE, b. 12 Aug. 1719; d. unmarried 1789.
 - x. LUCY BROOKE, b. 10 April 1721; mar. John Estep (d. 1766) of Charles Co.
 - xi. ISAAC BROOKE (twin), b. 22 Jan. 1722; d. unmarried 1 Nov. 1756.
 - xii. REBECCA BROOKE (twin), b. 22 Jan. 1722.
 - xiii. ELIZABETH BROOKE, b. 22 Sept. 1724; d. unmarried 1794.
 - xiv. DANIEL BROOKE, b. 5 May 1726; d. 8 Nov. 1735.
 - xv. CHARLES BROOKE, b. 14 Sept. 1727; d. 21 Sept. 1727.
 - xvi. ROBERT BROOKE, b. 25 Nov. 1728; d. unmarried 1777.
 - 30. xvii. CLEMENT BROOKE, b. 1 Sept. 1730; d. 18 Nov. 1800.
18. HENRY BROOKE⁶ (*Clement*,⁵ *Thomas*,⁴ *Robert*,³ *Thomas*,² *Richard*¹) of Prince George's Co., was born in 1704, and died in 1751. In a deposition his age is given as 37 years in 1741 (Chancery, I. R. No. 4, 419), and his will, dated 25 Sept. 1751, was proved 26 October following. By Margaret his wife he had issue:—
- i. HENRY BROOKE.⁷
 - ii. CLEMENT BROOKE.
 - iii. JOHN BROOKE.
 - iv. NICHOLAS BROOKE.
 - v. JANE BROOKE.
 - vi. MARY BROOKE.
 - vii. ANN BROOKE, mar. . . . Wade.
 - viii. RACHEL BROOKE, mar. . . . Boardman.
 - ix. SUSANNA BROOKE.
19. CLEMENT BROOKE⁶ (*Clement*,⁵ *Thomas*,⁴ *Robert*,³ *Thomas*,² *Richard*¹) of Prince George's Co. died in 1732. In his will, dated 31 Aug. 1731 proved 30 Aug. 1732, he states that he is bound, with Mary his wife, on a voyage for London, and mentions his daughter Rachel and his "honored father Mr. Clement Brooke." Mrs. Mary Brooke, widow of Clement, married secondly Dr. Charles Neale of Frederick Co. and executed with him, in 1769, a deed of trust for the benefit of her daughter Rachel.
- Clement Brooke and Mary his wife had issue:—
- i. RACHEL BROOKE,⁷ mar. Henry Darnall of Prince George's Co. Their daughter Mary Darnall married, 5 June 1768, Charles Carroll of Carrollton.
20. JAMES BROOKE⁶ (*Roger*,⁵ *Roger*,⁴ *Robert*,³ *Thomas*,² *Richard*¹) was born, according to family record, 21 Feb. 1705 and died 11 March 1784. He was married, 21 June 1725,

to Deborah, eldest daughter of Richard Snowden and Elizabeth (Coale) his wife. She died 29 April 1758. James Brooke and Deborah (Snowden) his wife had issue :—

- i. JAMES BROOKE,⁷ b. 26 Feb. 1730/1; d. 21 Aug. 1767; mar. Hannah Janney of Virginia, and left issue,
- ii. ROGER BROOKE, b. 9 Aug. 1734; d. 7. Sept. 1790; mar. Mary Matthews, who d. 25 April 1808, and had issue.
- iii. RICHARD BROOKE, b. 8 July 1736; d. 2 May 1788; mar., 1758, Jane Lynn (d. 15 Sept. 1774) and had issue.
- iv. BASIL BROOKE, b. 13 Dec. 1738; d. 22 Aug. 1794; mar., 1 May 1764, Elizabeth Hopkins (d. 17 Aug. 1794) and had issue.
- v. ELIZABETH BROOKE, b. 22 March 1740/1; mar., 2 June 1761, Thomas Pleasants of Goochland Co., Va.
- vi. THOMAS BROOKE, b. 8 March 1743/4; d. 11 June 1789.

An account of the descendants of James and Deborah (Snowden) Brooke is given in *The Thomas Book* (New York, 1896), p. 219 ff.

21. ROGER BROOKE⁶ (*Roger*,⁵ *Roger*,⁴ *Robert*,³ *Thomas*,² *Richard*¹) of Calvert Co. was born 10 June 1714, and died in 1772. His will, dated 8 Feb. 1772 and proved 9 April following, mentions his wife Elizabeth and his children Roger, Basil, John, Elizabeth, Sarah, Bowyer, and Dorothy Brooke, and Monica Taney. According to the statements of his descendants Roger Brooke was twice married, 1° to Sarah Bowyer of Philadelphia, who died about 1745-46, and 2° to Elizabeth Boarman.

By his first wife, Sarah Bowyer, he had issue :—

- i. ROGER BROOKE,⁷ His will (dated 6 Jan., proved 16 Aug. 1776) names his wife Mary; his daughter Sarah Brooke; his brothers Basil and John Brooke; and his kinsman Francis Brooke.
- ii. JOHN BROOKE (twin), b. 1737; d. young.
- iii. BOWYER BROOKE (twin), b. 1737; d. 1815; mar. 1° Mary Browne, 2° Hannah Reese, and left issue.
- iv. SARAH BROOKE.
- v. ANNA BROOKE.

By his second wife, Elizabeth Boarman, Roger Brooke had issue :—

- i. BASIL BROOKE, b. 1748; mar. Anne dau. of James and Mary (BROWN) Duke, and had an only child, Elizabeth Brooke (b. 31 Dec. 1780; d. 6 Oct. 1805), who mar. Dr. John Dare.
- ii. MONICA BROOKE, b. 1752; mar. Michael Taney. Their son, Roger Brooke Taney (b. 1777; d. 1864) was Chief-Justice of the United States.
- iii. ELIZABETH BROOKE.
- iv. JOHN BROOKE, b. 1753; d. 1790; mar. Mary Wheeler and had two children, a) John James Brooke, b. 11 Aug. 1787; d. 16 March 1836; mar. 23 Oct. 1814 Juliet Duke and had issue, b) Harriet Brooke, b. Sept. 1789; mar. Dr. Ireland and d. s. p.
- v. DOROTHY BROOKE.

For this account of the children of Roger Brooke, by his two wives, I am indebted to Mrs. Samuel T. Brown of Baltimore, Md., a granddaughter of John James Brooke (*John*,⁷ *Roger*⁶).

22. BASIL BROOKE⁶ (*Roger*,⁵ *Roger*,⁴ *Robert*,³ *Thomas*,² *Richard*¹) of Charles Co. was born 16 Nov. 1717 and died in 1761. His will, dated 14 May 1761, was proved 13 July following. He married Henrietta daughter of Raphael Neale of Charles Co. and Mary his wife, daughter of Baker Brooke.⁴ Her mother, Mrs. Mary Neale, mentions in her will (dated 29 Sept. 1760, proved 24 May 1763) her "daughter Henrietta Brooke" and her "son-in-law Basil Brooke." Mrs. Henrietta Brooke died in 1774, leaving a will dated 27 June 1773 and proved 16 June 1774.

Basil Brooke and Henrietta (Neale) his wife had issue:—

- i. RAPHAEL BROOKE.⁷
- ii. ROGER BROOKE.
- iii. JAMES BROOKE.
- iv. ANN BROOKE.

23. BASIL BROOKE⁶ (*John*,⁵ *Roger*,⁴ *Robert*,³ *Thomas*,² *Richard*¹) of Charles Co. died in 1757. His will, dated 24 April 1755, was proved 8 March 1757. He married first Dorothy daughter of Michael Taney of Calvert Co., and secondly Sarah Michael Taney, in his will dated 2 June 1743 and proved 24 March 1743/4, mentions his "daughter Dorothy Brooke" and his "son-in-law Basil Brooke," and the latter mentions his wife Sarah in his will.

Basil Brooke and Dorothy (Taney) his first wife had issue:—

- i. BASIL BROOKE.⁷
- ii. MICHAEL BROOKE.
- iii. MARY BROOKE.

24. ROBERT BROOKE⁶ (*Robert*,⁵ *Robert*,⁴ *Robert*,³ *Thomas*,² *Richard*¹) of Calvert Co. was born in 1692 and died in 1753. According to a deposition he was aged 37 years in 1729, and his will, made in 1748, was proved 15 Sept. 1753. He married Jane daughter of Cuthbert Fenwick of St. Mary's Co., who names in his will (proved 23 March 1729) his grandchildren Robert and Mary Brooke. Mrs. Jane Brooke survived her husband and died in 1759. Her will, dated 19 May 1758, was proved 21 March 1759.

Robert Brooke and Jane (Fenwick) his wife had issue:—

- i. ROBERT BROOKE.¹
- ii. WILLIAM BROOKE.
- iii. FRANCIS BROOKE.
- iv. HENRY BROOKE.
- v. CHARLES BROOKE.
- vi. MARY BROOKE, mar. Philip Fenwick.
- vii. SARAH BROOKE.
- viii. BARBARA BROOKE.
- ix. JANE BROOKE.

(To be Concluded.)

NOTES.

GOV. CHARLES CALVERT.—The parentage of Capt. Charles Calvert, Governor of Maryland 1720-1727, has never been ascertained. The following notes may possibly furnish a clue. 10 July 1701, Charles Lord Baltimore, "of our affection, speciall favour, certaine knowledge, and meer motion," grants to Mr. Charles Calvert Lazenby 1000 acres part of Portland Manor in Anne Arundel Co. (Lib. C. D., fol. 111). 10 Sept. 1709, Charles Calvert Lazenby of the Parish of St. James, Westminster, conveys to Henry Darnall of Prince George's County, in the Province of Maryland, 1000 acres part of Portland Manor (A. A. Co., Lib. P. K., fol. 191) and on the same date gives a power of attorney to William Holland and Samuel Chew of Anne Arundel County, Md., Esqrs., and Richard Harrison of the same place, merchant, to give possession of the lands (*ibid.* fol. 197). A little more than two months later, 27 Nov. 1709, Charles Calvert was gazetted Ensign in the First or Grenadier Guards, and was promoted, 4 Jan'y 1718, Lieutenant and Captain (Hamilton, *History of the Grenadier Guards*, iii, 442). 17 May 1720, Capt. Charles Calvert of His Majesty's First Regiment of Foot Guards, was appointed Governor of Maryland (State Paper Office, B. T., Maryland, i, 100). He held the office until 1727 when he was commissioned member of Council and served in this capacity until his death in 1733. He married, 21 Nov. 1722, Rebecca daughter of John Gerrard, Esq., of Prince George's County, and she died in January or February 1734/5 leaving two daughters, Anne and Elizabeth. Of these daughters, Anne seems to have died young, while Eliza-

beth married Benedict Calvert of Mt. Airy. The register of St. Anne's Parish, Annapolis, contains the following entry: "August 8th, 1722. Died Madam Margaret Lasenby Aunt to our present Governor Charles Calvert, Esq." She was apparently the wife of Henry Lazenby, High Sheriff of Anne Arundel County, who died 6 May 1723 (St. Anne's Register), intestate. Bond for the administration of his estate was filed, 10 June 1723, by William Holland and Samuel Chew, his administrators, in the sum of £2000 Sterling, with Philip Thomas and Stephen Warman as sureties (Test. Proc., Lib. 26, fol. 159). It is to be noted that the administrators are the same persons to whom Charles Calvert Lazenby gives a power of attorney for the sale of his land in 1709. Is it possible that Charles Calvert Lazenby, in the interval between 10 September and 27 November 1709, obtained a license to use the name of Calvert only, and that he is thus identical with Gov. Charles Calvert? Further evidence on this point is greatly to be desired.

TILGHMAN-WHETENHALL.—A correspondent asks for the descent of Susanna Whetenhall, wife of William Tilghman (*Mag.* p. 182), from King Edward III. It is as follows:—King Edward¹ III, mar. Philippa of Hainault; Edmund² Duke of York (b. 1341; d. 1402) mar. Isabel of Castile (d. 1392); Constance Plantagenet³ (d. 1416) mar., 1386, Thomas 6th Lord Despencer (b. 1373; d. 1400); Isabel Despencer,⁴ sole daughter and heiress, mar., 1411, Richard Beachamp (b. 1397; d. 1422) Earl of Worcester; Elizabeth Beauchamp⁵ (b. 1415; d. 1448) mar. Sir Edward Neville (d. 1476) Baron Abergavenny; Sir George Neville⁶ (d. 1492) Baron Abergavenny mar. Margaret Fenne (d. 1485) daughter of Sir Hugh Fenne; Elizabeth Neville⁷ mar. Thomas Berkeley (d. 1500) of Vyne Co. Southants; Alice Berkeley⁸ mar. George Whetenhall (d. 1573) of East Peckham, Kent; Thomas Whetenhall⁹ mar. Dorothy daughter of John Fane; Susanna Whetenhall¹⁰ mar. William Tilghman (b. 1518; d. 1594). The earlier descents may be readily found in any peerage or encyclopaedia; for the later descents reference may be had to Smith's *Lives of the Berkeleys*, i, 354; Berry's *Hampshire Genealogies*, p. 209; Morant's *History of Essex*, i, 238, 245; ii, 514; and the Whetenhall pedigree in *Harleian MS.* No. 1548, fol. 121.

FENDALL (*Mag.* p. 76).—Mary Fendall, sister of Col. John Fendall, was born in 1673 and died in 1751. She married 1° John Theobald (b. 1666; d. 1713), and 2° Matthew Barnes (b. 1670; d. 1745), both of Charles County. Her will, dated 18 Oct. 1750, was proved 20 July 1751. By her first husband she had issue:—i. William Theobald, d. 1751, mar. and left issue, ii. John Theobald, b. Sept. 1692, d. young, iii. John Theobald, d. 1741, mar. Elizabeth dau. of Robert Mason of St. Mary's Co. and had, with other issue a son Samuel, ancestor of Dr. Samuel Theobald of Baltimore, iv. Mary Theobald, mar. . . . Swann, v. Charity Theobald, living unmarried in 1750. By her second marriage, with Matthew Barnes, Mary Fendall appears to have had no issue.
